[moki]

Ah, the Economist; one of my favorite news sources on the planet, and one of the most respected. An old article, but as is usual with the Economist, a lucid one.

from: http://www.economist.com/displaystor...ory_id=1188823

.....

American primacy will continue to be welcomed by many, and tolerated by others, even if through gritted teeth

“YOU can always rely on America to do the right thing,” quipped Winston Churchill, one of America's greatest 20th-century fans. “Once it has exhausted the alternatives.” That quotation contains both the main components of what remains a typical European view of American foreign policy.

It contains admiration, founded on the experience that when America intervened in Europe's two great wars of the 20th century it did so on the right side, with the right values and with ultimate success. But it also contains a superiority complex, a view of Americans as bumblers or global ignoramuses. Given that Churchill presided over the handing to America in 1941-45 of what little world leadership Britain then retained, he could be forgiven for posing as teacher to America's pupil. Yet the syndrome has endured and even widened, half a century later.

Today's critics, and they are numerous even among its allies, tend to sneer that American activism is reviving only because the United States now itself feels under threat. It is, they say, a selfish, or at least self-centred, reaction to injury rather than a new internationalism; it is being led by an administration that rejoices in rejecting or abrogating international treaties, acting unilaterally rather than in multilateral concert with others; and they say that helpful activism will soon descend into adventurism. Moreover, in its use of military power, America seeks to make others—even its allies—take casualties rather than lose its own troops; and America's leaders are “simplistic” and “absolutist”.

These criticisms are three-quarters true, but they are far from devastating. Indeed, they may even be taken as compliments. In a democracy as open and cacophonous as America's, and with a constitution expressly designed to thwart decisive action by any single branch of government, it is hard to persuade a majority to support costly and risky international activism. Self-centredness is not only natural but legally required. There has, admittedly, long been a deep seam of morality running through American policy, epitomised by Woodrow Wilson's “Fourteen Points” in 1918 and repeated in President Bush's “non-negotiable demands” on other nations in his state-of-the-union address in January this year. But idealism has rarely been enough to bring about timely or sustained action overseas; even Hitler's fascism required Pearl Harbour before Franklin Roosevelt dared enter the second world war overtly.

More will be said in a later section about treaties and their abrogation; there is right on both sides in different cases, and America's constitution queers the pitch by placing domestic law and Congress above all such international obligations. But on the Bush administration's side is the pragmatic argument that treaties are an inter-governmental means to an end, not an end in themselves; if, as with deals intended to counter the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the treaties are being flouted (eg, by Iraq), someone has to provide the leadership to ensure that crucial treaties such as these are enforced.

The reluctance to take casualties reflects two things, one good, the other less so. The good cause is democracy itself, which in America makes politicians keen to preserve their citizens' lives and in Europe makes them want to spend as little as possible on defence. Even during the second world war, when nearly 300,000 American lives were lost, it can be argued that America won by using millions of Russian soldiers as its proxies against Hitler, rather as it recently used the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. Still, given that America has 725 military installations outside its own territory, of which 17 are fully fledged bases, and that of its 1.4m active servicemen 250,000 are deployed overseas, it cannot really be accused of hiding in a continental shell.

The less good cause is the fear of failure that has, since Vietnam, led American generals and politicians to withdraw quickly from military trouble overseas, even when (as in Somalia in 1993) opinion polls support continued engagement. In the 1990s that tendency made the United States look weak and malleable despite its military prowess, and may well have encouraged Osama bin Laden in his attacks.

And simplistic, absolutist? That is how Chris Patten, the European Union's commissioner for external relations, described President Bush's “axis of evil” speech, just as legions of European critics lambasted Ronald Reagan's description of the Soviet Union as “an evil empire” in the early 1980s. It is the reverse of the criticism that America acts in its well-calculated self-interest, for both these presidents were using moral language to rally support and clarify their intentions, to foes as well as friends. Such clarity always comes at the price of simplicity, but the real question is whether it is backed by credibility. Before September 11th, it would not have been. The trouble with European sophistication is that it has been backed by virtually nothing, either before or since that date.

President Bush's moral tone has strength because it is now backed by popular democratic support in the face of fear, and by the credible threat of military force. It is not quite clear that Americans will “bear any burden, pay any price” for liberty and security, as President Kennedy urged in 1961, but it is clear that neither politicians nor generals will now withdraw at the first whiff of failure. If anything, the danger is the opposite: that, as in Vietnam, the need to succeed abroad could in some cases blind them to an emerging reality in which success is unattainable.

(continued)

[moki]

Whose side would you rather be on?

The gripes are global. Japanese and Chinese have queued up to buy books that advocate “saying no” to the bossy Americans. Russians have talked approvingly of partnerships with China, India or others to balance the sole superpower. Europeans—and not just the French—have said they must be united in order to provide a counterweight to the United States. Appalling numbers of European pundits, including British ones, alas, argued that although September 11th was dreadful, it was the inevitable result of American policies. And of course there is Iran, to which the United States is always the Great Satan.

The question, though, is what weight to give to such sniping. If you were to take it literally, you might worry, along with quite a few international-relations theorists, that today's American dominance will lead inexorably to global or local alliances against it. American power is not a solution, but a problem in itself. The world, on this view, demands some sort of balance and so, in time, one will form as others gang up against the arrogant hegemon. Or you might worry that a resented America will increasingly have to act alone, as it did in Vietnam, and that it will again be weakened or disheartened when it fails. And then the world will become more dangerous.

Of these, the second is much the bigger risk. To see why, look first at what other countries do rather than what their people say. There is no doubt that America's military lead is huge, and that its economic and technological lead is also large. Table 2, updated from a 1999 article in International Security by William Wohlforth of Georgetown University, shows how America's lead over others on pure economic and military measures is far larger than that held by Britain in 1870, and the lead on military measures is larger than America itself held in 1950.



The military gap, in particular, has been getting larger since 1989, and continues to do so. As chart 3 shows, until recently America was cutting its defence spending in real terms. Others, though, were also cutting theirs rapidly. Even China has hardly been narrowing the gap. And, in terms of effectiveness, the gaps are wider still thanks to America's technological lead and professional armed forces. America's European and Japanese allies have not been trying to narrow it; both have sought at times to retain some independence, by developing their own hardware or satellite systems, but not actually to compete with the superpower.

This is not what you would expect if the ganging-up theory held true. America's power should lead others to spend more, not less. Some countries are, indeed, spending more, but for fear of each other, not of America: India and Pakistan have raced each other on arms, and many countries in East Asia have been bolstering their defences. Most, though, have been—and still are—responding to America's military lead by shrugging their shoulders and cutting or freezing their budgets. To Europeans, and still more to Russians, it is all a trifle embarrassing; hence the European talk about a unified defence force alongside NATO , but not, so far, any extra money. Tant pis , they seem to say: America is not a threat, so why bother to counter it?



It is rather better, in fact, to be on America's side. And that is where, for all the gripes, more and more countries are finding themselves. Even the balance-of-power theorists recognise this tendency of “bandwagoning”. In regions where there is a prospect that one country might come to dominate, the incentive to ally with America is even stronger: hence the enthusiasm in East Asia for American participation, rather than have China or Japan take the lead. When America was ignoring Afghanistan, Pakistan took the Taliban's side; as soon as America returned, Pakistan jumped into its camp. Despite concern over a future attack on Iraq, criticism of America still centres more often on its failures to act or participate than on the threat it, or its adventures, pose to others.

Ganging up is likelier, as well as already more common, in economic matters. America has the world's biggest economy and is the biggest trader, but it is matched by the similarly sized European Union, which speaks with one voice on trade policy, and by the second-biggest national economy, Japan. It cannot automatically get its way in the running of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, despite being their biggest shareholder; it has voluntarily (if grudgingly) pooled its sovereignty in the World Trade Organisation; and other countries have happily ignored its objections to international environmental deals or judicial arrangements and gone ahead to set them up themselves (even if the United States then remains outside them).

Such issues are instructive, however. Although ganging up on America is in principle likelier in trade and finance, and does occasionally happen, the prospects for it are limited by one big thing: that if you favour freer trade, or readier access to finance, America is generally the main proponent of both. And many more countries have, in the past dozen years, opted to join the American-led system of liberal trade and capital flows. Where America favours selfish protectionism, notably for agriculture, steel and textiles, the Europeans have favoured it too. A lack of American leadership on trade liberalisation might set back that cause considerably, but it would not bring about anti-American alliances.

Benign selfishness

For sure, the United States is, by its very nature, a selfish superpower. Its sheer power allows it to override objections from others and sometimes to be careless, since it knows—or thinks—it will be able to sort messes out later. Its immigrants went there to better themselves, to escape worse conditions elsewhere, to leave the world rather than lead it. Its constitution is designed to prevent not only strong government but also any interference from outside. When morality and idealism do start to take over the language of foreign policy, they are generally balanced by a more pragmatic search for the national interest, thanks to the discipline of democracy. Wilsonian morality has long tussled with the realpolitik of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Kissinger, and does so even in the words and deeds of George Bush.

Yet America's national interest is special, and not only to starry American eyes. It offers the closest match there is to a world interest. The desire for unimpeded trade, the rule of law, safety and security, the protection of property and the free movement of people and capital match world needs, not just American ones. Only when captured by the sectional interests of particular business, ethnic or religious groups do those American interests conflict with wider ones, as was recently shown by the steel tariffs, and has also been the case with some environmental laws, including the Kyoto deal. But as long as most American selfishness remains of the benign sort, it is unlikely to be opposed on a large scale, by coalitions of countries.

This does not, and never will, eliminate the niggles and the sniping from within America's growing band of allies, for pride is concerned as well as commercial interests, and the general match between American interests and the world's does conceal many specific frictions. But it limits the sniping's importance.

Even if they do not confront it, however, disgruntled allies can react to American actions in two other unhelpful ways. They can sit on their hands and leave America to get on with things, knowing that in a turbulent world there are limits to what even a superpower can achieve on its own. Alternatively, they can make life even harder for America by accepting its leadership but also surreptitiously selling trouble-makers the wherewithal to cause more trouble, such as missile technology or nuclear materials, or merely doing investment deals with the pariahs. That is what France, China and Russia have been doing, to different degrees, in recent years, in particular in Iraq. Yet America now has the chance to turn at least one of those countries into a far more co-operative ally and perhaps—just perhaps—to open a new chapter in worldwide efforts to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

[eklipse]

Seriously, other than some serious back-patting and an insinuation that what works (sort of) for America should work for the rest of the world, what is the author trying to get at?

...Yet America now has the chance to turn at least one of those countries [Iraq] into a far more co-operative ally and perhaps—just perhaps—to open a new chapter in worldwide efforts to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I wouldn't hold my breath on this one.

[Spliffdaddy]

That's a very reasonable perspective shown in the article. If America was truly a threat - there would be some effort made to counter the threat. Since just the opposite has happened (ie, weaker militaries) it can be assumed that America is not viewed as a threat.

Just like the cops. Nobody likes you until they need your help. Then they merely tolerate you. It's our fault if we don't show up in a timely manner. It's our fault if we make a mess of things. It's always our fault because we're the only ones taking an active role in solving the problem.

I've said it before and it's worth repeating: Actions speak louder than words.

Talk all the crap you want about the US - but it won't mean a thang as long as you're not willing to do something for your damn self.

[version]

Another pointless post by Moki, proving nothing, except his inability to see the reality through the fog of nonsense. Why post such drivel? Give a kid all the guns in the world, doesn't make him smart, or have the ability to use them properly.

[spacefreak]

Originally posted by version:
Another pointless post by Moki, proving nothing, except his inability to see the reality through the fog of nonsense.

Pointless only to those with anti-American agendas.

[finboy]

Originally posted by version:
Another pointless post by Moki, proving nothing, except his inability to see the reality through the fog of nonsense. Why post such drivel? Give a kid all the guns in the world, doesn't make him smart, or have the ability to use them properly.

Nobody GAVE the kid the guns in this case. It worked for them, and used them to keep a lot of the "adults" of the world out of the fudge for the last 100 years.

[moki]

Originally posted by version:
Another pointless post by Moki, proving nothing, except his inability to see the reality through the fog of nonsense. Why post such drivel? Give a kid all the guns in the world, doesn't make him smart, or have the ability to use them properly.

I actually wasn't attempting to "prove" anything, I was merely posting an article that I found interesting, and hoped would result in and interesting intellectual discussion. In your case, this seems to have failed.

(sidenote: calling "The Economist" drivel is probably not something that would be supported by any thinking person, even if they disagree with a stance that publication takes on a given issue)

[version]

Originally posted by moki:
I actually wasn't attempting to "prove" anything, I was merely posting an article that I found interesting, and hoped would result in and interesting intellectual discussion. In your case, this seems to have failed.

(sidenote: calling "The Economist" drivel is probably not something that would be supported by any thinking person, even if they disagree with a stance that publication takes on a given issue)

The drivel I am referign to, is your constant post on things which jsut seem to tow the Bush line, and in constant praise of the cretin. Contention is a poor suppliment to solid argument.

Finboy: what are you talking about?

[moki]

Originally posted by eklipse:

argh, my eyes! Use Snapz Pro X for your screenshots with the window borders, it looks much nicer like this:

[moki]

Originally posted by version:
The drivel I am referign to, is your constant post on things which jsut seem to tow the Bush line, and in constant praise of the cretin.

Alas, I did not vote for Bush, I am not a republican, nor do I agree with Mr. Bush on all issues.

However, I do agree with him on some; I take things issue by issue, and for some things, I think he has done an excellent job.

I find it much more useful to address the issues for their merit rather than dismissing and diminishing anything that a person does because of your very apparent hatred for them.

[version]

Originally posted by moki:
Alas, I did not vote for Bush, I am not a republican, nor do I agree with Mr. Bush on all issues.

However, I do agree with him on some; I take things issue by issue, and for some things, I think he has done an excellent job.

I find it much more useful to address the issues for their merit rather than dismissing and diminishing anything that a person does because of your very apparent hatred for them.

it's not about hatred, the issues are real, and people are dying over his commands. He is a danger, and no amount of arguing will change this man's worldview. he needs to be removed, by anyone.

[eklipse]

Originally posted by moki:
argh, my eyes! Use Snapz Pro X for your screenshots with the window borders,

Will do. I do actually own a copy - just being lazy.

[moki]

Originally posted by version:
it's not about hatred, the issues are real, and people are dying over his commands. He is a danger, and no amount of arguing will change this man's worldview. he needs to be removed, by anyone.

Well, from what I have seen, from you, it very much seems to be about hatred. You seem to viciously hate the man, not to be intellectually be disagreeing with certain things that he's doing/has done.

You seem to feel that I cheerlead Bush; but on many issues, I disagree with him. Branding me as a Bush toadie is unfair, and an unfortunate way to dismiss the views I have on his various policies.

For instance, the war in Iraq can very well turn out to be a landmark event in the world, if it brings a stable democracy to the region, and therefore encourages it elsewhere in the world, and especially in the middle east. That's a big if, but by remaining committed to these ends in Iraq, we can absolutely make it happen.