[Millennium]

There is a lot of talk nowadays of the "mishandling" of the rebuilding of Iraq. A lot of it seems to generally stem from a sentiment that the US is not moving fast enough. So, as an honest question, I ask: where should we be? Assume that Iraq needs rebuilding (I don't think anyone would argue otherwise at this point, regardless of what they think of the situation that got Iraq into that state). Where would a competently-run rebuilding process be at this time?

[thunderous_funker]

For me its not a matter of how far along we are or are not in the reconstruction. Its a matter of management and use of resources.

Anyone could have predicted that using the combat troops for post-war security operations would be frought with unecessary complications and dangers. I thought this was a military lesson learned long ago.

Liberating Iraqis has now become Liberalization of Iraqi Markets. The military operation was to remove Saddam, find WMD and hand over power. Now the military is in the business of overseeing the privatization of Iraqi infastructure, tax reform and currency issues. How anyone thought undertaking these measures with the oversight of the US (let alone the US military) wouldn't send off the "White Man's Burden Imperialism" alarms all over the Arab world (and some of our allies) is sheer arrogance or calloused stupidity.

All of the high Idealism spouted by the administration concerning Liberation and Humanitarian Intervention has been horribly undermined by these actions. Considering how low our credibility in the region was to begin with, this was unforgivably poor planning.

So now we have a Catch-22 that the US presence is breeding unrest and insecurity, but the US can't leave because of unrest and insecurity. Hence all the talk of "quagmire".

A resounding military victory should have immediately been turned into a civilian and International post-war security detail and political transition authority.

[zigzag]

Speaking strictly as an armchair observer (which we all are), the most credible analysis I've heard is that you can't very easily rebuild a country when (a) the physical infrastructure is damaged and keeps getting sabotaged, (b) the bureaucratic infrastructure has been looted, and (c) there is "untidiness" in the streets and an active opposition. All of these can be traced at least in part to inadequate planning on the part of the administration. So, while I would expect it to take a good while for the country/government to be rebuilt even under the best of circumstances, it seems that the process is being severely impeded by inadequate security measures, which is why the administration is asking the U.N. for help.

[BRussell]

Where should we be? How about not having Americans killed there every day?

I don't think the main criticism is that "things aren't moving fast enough." I personally think the worst thing we could do is what France is suggesting - basically turn everything over to the Iraqis in a matter of weeks. France probably knows this, and basically wants us to fail, which is why they're suggesting it in the first place.

[mr. natural]

Briefly stated, where I think "a competently run rebuilding process be at this time" would mean that basic needs - water systems (of both supply and disposal) and the electric grid at the very least - are functioning almost 100% of the time everywhere. Apart from the water system which took a hit under the "sanctions" these needs were running pretty fine up until the War.

I can only imagine that had the UN been involved from the start these things might be in better shape today than they are. And obviously we need UN help to fix these basic essentials sooner than the later that has been the case. Thankfully, the food supply seems fine. Nor was there massive loss of housing. In any event, the repair and security of these other essential needs could of been better attended to sooner.

This would of likely contributed to a better overall sense of recovery and stability, leading to a greater sense of hope and focusing sooner on transition to self-government issues. Which is the whole point, no?

I also think basic security/police issues should be in better shape than they are. Here again, perhaps with more UN help from the get-go this might have been managed better. In retrospect, it seems that disbanding all the armed forces was not such a good idea. A lot of these men could of been put to good use with this security/police issue and helped stabilize things like traffic control, etc., sooner.

So, off hand these are my thoughts on *where* we could of been now had things gone down differently.

However, I wish it to be known that I have not been lambasting this administration since this *preemptive* act on the "mishandling" after the fact. I was against this War from the beginning because I presumed that things would go badly precisely because of the "mishandled" start.

Nor am I comforted by any of this no matter you look at it. I think we have lost ground on the War against Terrorism (anyone remember Osama?), and we are now more deeply imbedded in the "geographic base" of the fanatical middle eastern breeding ground for terrorists and all their gripes against us. Furthermore, we are that farther away from energy independence of our oil addiction. What a frigging shame and waste all this has been.

[Face Ache]

First, you turn back time...

[MacGorilla]

I think the Iraqi reconstruction was poorly thought out. We need to rethink the whole thing NOW if we are going to make it work.

[eklipse]

This has been discussed before. Basically power should have been handed over to a democratically elected Iraqi government as soon as possible. All further decisions regarding reconstruction and management of the country's resources should have been left entirely up to them.

[Joshua]

Originally posted by eklipse:
This has been discussed before. Basically power should have been handed over to a democratically elected Iraqi government as soon as possible. All further decisions regarding reconstruction and management of the country's resources should have been left entirely up to them.

I'm curious: what makes you think a quick turn over of power would have led to long term stability? And do you think that, right now, the country is in a position to hold a fair, democratic election?

[eklipse]

Originally posted by Joshua:
I'm curious: what makes you think a quick turn over of power would have led to long term stability?

The Iraqis are likely to be more accepting of a government that is directly chosen by them and is not seen as a handpicked American puppet show. It would also give the resistance one less piece of recruiting material.

And do you think that, right now, the country is in a position to hold a fair, democratic election?

Free elections may not have been possible immediately, but to date they don't even appear to have been a high priority or a serious goal. The focus seems to be on privatizing as much Iraqi infrastructure as possible, handing out juicy contracts to American companies and investing in fluffy reconstruction efforts that appear designed to distract the Iraqis from recognizing the fact that they have still not achieved 'freedom'.

[AutoJC]

Originally posted by Millennium:
There is a lot of talk nowadays of the "mishandling" of the rebuilding of Iraq. A lot of it seems to generally stem from a sentiment that the US is not moving fast enough. So, as an honest question, I ask: where should we be? Assume that Iraq needs rebuilding (I don't think anyone would argue otherwise at this point, regardless of what they think of the situation that got Iraq into that state). Where would a competently-run rebuilding process be at this time?

In the hands of the private sector, under the protection of the constitutional republic of Iraq.

I am dismayed that law and order has not been totally set up. I think a great part of the problem is finding a leader who is not allied with the fundamentalist tribes or the Baath party to run for president.

Afghanistan was easier in this regard. They found a coalition guy, Karzai.

[AutoJC]

Originally posted by eklipse:
[B]The Iraqis are likely to be more accepting of a government that is directly chosen by them and is not seen as a handpicked American puppet show. It would also give the resistance one less piece of recruiting material.

Inclined to disagree.

One great problem is the lack of a unifier who's "Iraqi." There are several major Muslim sects and they are all hostile to each other.

It's too convenient to assume the resistance to America is coming from the Baath supporters, because the Shiites, for example, don't like us either.

[eklipse]

Originally posted by AutoJC:
It's too convenient to assume the resistance to America is coming from the Baath supporters, because the Shiites, for example, don't like us either.

....which is more of an incentive to hand over power to a legitimate Iraqi administration and get the hell out of there.

If Americans do stay in Iraq, let it be at the request of an accepted and representative government.

[Joshua]

Originally posted by eklipse:
The Iraqis are likely to be more accepting of a government that is directly chosen by them and is not seen as a handpicked American puppet show. It would also give the resistance one less piece of recruiting material.

The idea that the Governing Council is a useless puppet regime is largely a Western notion, I think. The Iraqis certainly realize the GC is being influenced by the coalitions interests, but according to a recent Gallup pole (summary here), only 13% feel that it's performing poorly compared to 40% who give it a favorable rating.

Democracy is not the goal of the resistance, and I suspect they would be sabotaging the rebuilding process regardless of who's in charge.

Free elections may not have been possible immediately, but to date they don't even appear to have been a high priority or a serious goal. The focus seems to be on privatizing as much Iraqi infrastructure as possible, handing out juicy contracts to American companies and investing in fluffy reconstruction efforts that appear designed to distract the Iraqis from recognizing the fact that they have still not achieved 'freedom'.

I just don't understand what makes you think that free elections aren't a high priority or a "serious goal." Bush, Blair, and the authorities on the ground in Iraq constantly refer to this as the goal. You may disagree on the timetable, but you can't say it isn't what they're working towards.

As far as reconstruction goes, you can read this if you want a first hand account of how hard people are working to get Iraq back on its feet. I think the people putting their lives on the line to get the economy, infrastructure, hospitals, schools, etc. back together would object to the notion that the reconstruction efforts aren't genuine.

[eklipse]

Originally posted by Joshua:
The idea that the Governing Council is a useless puppet regime is largely a Western notion, I think. The Iraqis certainly realize the GC is being influenced by the coalitions interests, but according to a recent Gallup pole (summary here), only 13% feel that it's performing poorly compared to 40% who give it a favorable rating.

"Oh, people can come up with statistics to prove anything. 14% of people know that." - Homer Simpson

Seriously though, a poll of 1,178 Iraqis in Baghdad alone is hardly indicative of the sentiment across Iraq's diverse population. Even if the Iraqis interviewed were amongst the most optimistic and patient, I would be interested to see what the same Iraqis are saying several years (or even months) down the line with no recognizable Iraqi government in place.

Democracy is not the goal of the resistance, and I suspect they would be sabotaging the rebuilding process regardless of who's in charge.

Government from Washington is not a goal of any patriotic Iraqi.

I just don't understand what makes you think that free elections aren't a high priority or a "serious goal." Bush, Blair, and the authorities on the ground in Iraq constantly refer to this as the goal. You may disagree on the timetable, but you can't say it isn't what they're working towards.

The timetable is the biggest cause for concern. If one is serious about bringing self-governing democracy to a country it should be the highest priority - privatizing infrastructure and handing out contracts should be secondary. The fact that these things are taking place before elected representatives take office is suspicious and certainly not constructive towards the goals of peace, stability and security.

As far as reconstruction goes, you can read this if you want a first hand account of how hard people are working to get Iraq back on its feet. I think the people putting their lives on the line to get the economy, infrastructure, hospitals, schools, etc. back together would object to the notion that the reconstruction efforts aren't genuine.

This is what I mean by 'fluffy reconstruction'. These projects should be being carried out under an Iraqi mandate, the fact that they are not suggests an effort on America's part to try and camouflage the lack of legitimate government. Also, don't forget the role sanctions played in the dilapidation of Iraq's infrastructure, Iraq was doing pretty good before America intervened at all.

[OldManMac]

Why are we talking about "giving them a democracy?" These people don't have a clue what democracy is, and there are numerous factions, each of which has their own agenda to push. Many of these people have known nothing but tribal fighting their entire lives; now we think that we're just going to march in there, and tell them to kiss and make up, and they're going to obey, just because we said so?

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by AutoJC:
Afghanistan was easier in this regard. They found a coalition guy, Karzai.

Curious choice of examples.

Karzai was from a well respected Pashtun family and commanded some important tribal allegiences, but he was not a democratically elected leader in any real sense of the term.

The Loya Jirga was grossly manipulated by the Coalition to the exclusion of many nominees. In fact, it was not so subtley hinted that all the foreign investment and aid that had been promised to Karzai on his whirlwind speaking tour (when he was merely the US's liason to Afghanistan and not the "elected" leader) would probably not materialize if the Loya Jirga elected someone else.

Several prominent tribal leaders (including Pashtuns) declared the Loya Jirga invalid, stormed out and have been in open opposition to the Karzai government ever since. Which is why the Karzai government is almost entirely powerless outside of Kabul and his control over Kabul is tenuous.

I think this is informative at analyzing the Iraqi post-war situation. It is clear to many observers (and even admitted to in certain degree by Wolfowitz and others) that the US thought it could do much the same thing in Iraq that it did in Afghanistan--quickly install their guy without much trouble and leaving most of Iraq's bureaucracy intact.

But you had a major division within the administration which guy was going to be annointed. The Pentagon wanted Chalabi, but the State dept. was favoring an Iraqi military leader or insider (probably Gen. Nizar al-Khazraji). The various Iraqi dissident groups that had been cooperating with the administration on forming the Regime Change policy broke out into infighting--particulary between the Kurdish groups and the INC. Khazraji got indicted by a Danish court for war crimes which took him off the table.

So some of them various candidates took matters into their own hands and entered the country and started trying to secure their support. Amost immediately there was an Iraqi backlash against them including violence against Shia leaders who attempted to push support towards some of the dissidents-who-would-be-king.

So the administration was stymied by it's own infighting, the infighting of the dissident groups and the total outbreak of spontaneous democratic feeling in Iraq that rejected all of the above. The political organization of Shias caught them off balance and threatened to dominate any quick elections. The Ba'athist resistance caught them off guard because it resulted in total dissolution of the civil society and buraucracy that they had hoped could be quickly decapitated and kept intact.

Not only did military, paramilitary and newly formed resistance groups all melt away into Iraq society and start undermining the quick and easy transition envisioned by the administration, but certain infastructures proved to be vastly more incapable than they had counted on. Mostly, the police and army. Both of which the administration had figured could be preserved and utilized for security operations once their leadership had been changed (because the change in leadership would be welcomed, they assumed). Not only that, but the police and army proved largely incompetent so they were useless without the autocratic regime and fear culture that had covered up for their incompetence during the Saddam years. Police had not even the most rudimentary skills in police work.

The stop-gap solution was the GC which contained all of the infighting dissidents plus the organized local leaders who couldn't be marginalized in the power vacuum.

Stuck with a group over which they had only limited control and which represented undersirable segments of the Iraqi population in surprising solidarity, it became necessary for the timetable to be completely rewritten to extend US control indefinitely until a US-approved patsy could emerge from the GC. In the meantime, it became necessary to push for the radical market liberalization that was a large part of the invasion plan in the first place but were assumed would be carried out by the patsy who was going to be quickly put in place.

Now the US had no choice but to use the US military presence as the leverage to push for these "reforms" since they don't have a pliable leader in place.

Ultimately, it will be these economic exploitations that will undo the US. When Iraqis realize they are being led down the primrose path towards Argentina's economy they will not stand for it. Then the US will have to choose between supporting another autocratic central regime (like they supported Saddam) or abandoning the project altogether and watching another Iranian revolution and hoping the outcome is more favorable this time around.