[BlackGriffen]

Available here (Salon - no registration or ad required this time):
Excerpts:

In July of last year, after just over 20 years of service, I retired as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Air Force. I had served as a communications officer in the field and in acquisition programs, as a speechwriter for the National Security Agency director, and on the Headquarters Air Force and the office of the secretary of defense staffs covering African affairs. I had completed Air Command and Staff College and Navy War College seminar programs, two master's degrees, and everything but my Ph.D. dissertation in world politics at Catholic University. I regarded my military vocation as interesting, rewarding and apolitical. My career started in 1978 with the smooth seduction of a full four-year ROTC scholarship. It ended with 10 months of duty in a strange new country, observing up close and personal a process of decision making for war not sanctioned by the Constitution we had all sworn to uphold. Ben Franklin's comment that the Constitutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia had delivered "a republic, madam, if you can keep it" would come to have special meaning.

In the spring of 2002, I was a cynical but willing staff officer, almost two years into my three-year tour at the office of the secretary of defense, undersecretary for policy, sub-Saharan Africa. In April, a call for volunteers went out for the Near East South Asia directorate (NESA). None materialized. By May, the call transmogrified into a posthaste demand for any staff officer, and I was "volunteered" to enter what would be a well-appointed den of iniquity.

The education I would receive there was like an M. Night Shyamalan movie -- intense, fascinating and frightening. While the people were very much alive, I saw a dead philosophy -- Cold War anti-communism and neo-imperialism -- walking the corridors of the Pentagon. It wore the clothing of counterterrorism and spoke the language of a holy war between good and evil. The evil was recognized by the leadership to be resident mainly in the Middle East and articulated by Islamic clerics and radicals. But there were other enemies within, anyone who dared voice any skepticism about their grand plans, including Secretary of State Colin Powell and Gen. Anthony Zinni.

From May 2002 until February 2003, I observed firsthand the formation of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans and watched the latter stages of the neoconservative capture of the policy-intelligence nexus in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. This seizure of the reins of U.S. Middle East policy was directly visible to many of us working in the Near East South Asia policy office, and yet there seemed to be little any of us could do about it.

I saw a narrow and deeply flawed policy favored by some executive appointees in the Pentagon used to manipulate and pressurize the traditional relationship between policymakers in the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies.

I witnessed neoconservative agenda bearers within OSP usurp measured and carefully considered assessments, and through suppression and distortion of intelligence analysis promulgate what were in fact falsehoods to both Congress and the executive office of the president.

While this commandeering of a narrow segment of both intelligence production and American foreign policy matched closely with the well-published desires of the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party, many of us in the Pentagon, conservatives and liberals alike, felt that this agenda, whatever its flaws or merits, had never been openly presented to the American people. Instead, the public story line was a fear-peddling and confusing set of messages, designed to take Congress and the country into a war of executive choice, a war based on false pretenses, and a war one year later Americans do not really understand. That is why I have gone public with my account.

[...]

I learned that there was indeed a preferred ideology for NESA. My first day in the office, a GS-15 career civil servant rather unhappily advised me that if I wanted to be successful here, I'd better remember not to say anything positive about the Palestinians. This belied official U.S. policy of serving as an honest broker for resolution of Israeli and Palestinian security concerns. At that time, there was a great deal of talk about Bush's possible support for a Palestinian state. That the Pentagon could have implemented and, worse, was implementing its own foreign policy had not yet occurred to me.

[...]

Trigilio and I had hallway debates, as friends. The one I remember most clearly was shortly after President Bush gave his famous "mushroom cloud" speech in Cincinnati in October 2002, asserting that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction as well as ties to "international terrorists," and was working feverishly to develop nuclear weapons with "nuclear holy warriors." I asked John who was feeding the president all the bull about Saddam and the threat he posed us in terms of WMD delivery and his links to terrorists, as none of this was in secret intelligence I had seen in the past years. John insisted that it wasn't an exaggeration, but when pressed to say which actual intelligence reports made these claims, he would only say, "Karen, we have sources that you don't have access to." It was widely felt by those of us in the office not in the neoconservatives' inner circle that these "sources" related to the chummy relationship that Ahmad Chalabi had with both the Office of Special Plans and the office of the vice president.

[...]

After August 2002, the Office of Special Plans established its own rhythm and cadence separate from the non-politically minded professionals covering the rest of the region. While often accused of creating intelligence, I saw only two apparent products of this office: war planning guidance for Rumsfeld, presumably impacting Central Command, and talking points on Iraq, WMD and terrorism. These internal talking points seemed to be a mélange crafted from obvious past observation and intelligence bits and pieces of dubious origin. They were propagandistic in style, and all desk officers were ordered to use them verbatim in the preparation of any material prepared for higher-ups and people outside the Pentagon. The talking points included statements about Saddam Hussein's proclivity for using chemical weapons against his own citizens and neighbors, his existing relations with terrorists based on a member of al-Qaida reportedly receiving medical care in Baghdad, his widely publicized aid to the Palestinians, and general indications of an aggressive viability in Saddam Hussein's nuclear weapons program and his ongoing efforts to use them against his neighbors or give them to al-Qaida style groups. The talking points said he was threatening his neighbors and was a serious threat to the U.S., too.

[...]

Even the most casual observer could note the tension and even animosity between "Wild Bill" Luti (as we came to refer to our boss) and Bruce Hardcastle, our defense intelligence officer (DIO). Certainly, there were stylistic and personality differences. Hardcastle, like most senior intelligence officers I knew, was serious, reserved, deliberate, and went to great lengths to achieve precision and accuracy in his speech and writing. Luti was the kind of guy who, in staff meetings and in conversations, would jump from grand theory to administrative minutiae with nary a blink or a fleeting shadow of self-awareness.

I discovered that Luti and possibly others within OSP were dissatisfied with Hardcastle's briefings, in particular with the aspects relating to WMD and terrorism. I was not clear exactly what those concerns were, but I came to understand that the DIA briefing did not match what OSP was claiming about Iraq's WMD capabilities and terrorist activities. I learned that shortly before I arrived there had been an incident in NESA where Hardcastle's presence and briefing at a bilateral meeting had been nixed abruptly by Luti. The story circulating among the desk officers was "a last-minute cancellation" of the DIO presentation. Hardcastle's intelligence briefing was replaced with one prepared by another Policy office that worked nonproliferation issues. While this alternative briefing relied on intelligence produced by DIO and elsewhere, it was not a product of the DIA or CIA community, but instead was an OSD Policy "branded" product -- and so were its conclusions. The message sent by Policy appointees and well understood by staff officers and the defense intelligence community was that senior appointed civilians were willing to exclude or marginalize intelligence products that did not fit the agenda.

[continues...]

[BlackGriffen]

Staff officers would always request OSP's most current Iraq, WMD and terrorism talking points. On occasion, these weren't available in an approved form and awaited Shulsky's approval. The talking points were a series of bulleted statements, written persuasively and in a convincing way, and superficially they seemed reasonable and rational. Saddam Hussein had gassed his neighbors, abused his people, and was continuing in that mode, becoming an imminently dangerous threat to his neighbors and to us -- except that none of his neighbors or Israel felt this was the case. Saddam Hussein had harbored al-Qaida operatives and offered and probably provided them with training facilities -- without mentioning that the suspected facilities were in the U.S./Kurdish-controlled part of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was pursuing and had WMD of the type that could be used by him, in conjunction with al-Qaida and other terrorists, to attack and damage American interests, Americans and America -- except the intelligence didn't really say that. Saddam Hussein had not been seriously weakened by war and sanctions and weekly bombings over the past 12 years, and in fact was plotting to hurt America and support anti-American activities, in part through his carrying on with terrorists -- although here the intelligence said the opposite. His support for the Palestinians and Arafat proved his terrorist connections, and basically, the time to act was now. This was the gist of the talking points, and it remained on message throughout the time I watched the points evolve.

But evolve they did, and the subtle changes I saw from September to late January revealed what the Office of Special Plans was contributing to national security. Two key types of modifications were directed or approved by Shulsky and his team of politicos. First was the deletion of entire references or bullets. The one I remember most specifically is when they dropped the bullet that said one of Saddam's intelligence operatives had met with Mohammad Atta in Prague, supposedly salient proof that Saddam was in part responsible for the 9/11 attack. That claim had lasted through a number of revisions, but after the media reported the claim as unsubstantiated by U.S. intelligence, denied by the Czech government, and that Atta's location had been confirmed by the FBI to be elsewhere, that particular bullet was dropped entirely from our "advice on things to say" to senior Pentagon officials when they met with guests or outsiders.

[...]

It is interesting today that the "defense" for those who lied or prevaricated about Iraq is to point the finger at the intelligence. But the National Intelligence Estimate, published in September 2002, as remarked upon recently by former CIA Middle East chief Ray McGovern, was an afterthought. It was provoked only after Sens. Bob Graham and Dick Durban noted in August 2002, as Congress was being asked to support a resolution for preemptive war, that no NIE elaborating real threats to the United States had been provided. In fact, it had not been written, but a suitable NIE was dutifully prepared and submitted the very next month. Naturally, this document largely supported most of the outrageous statements already made publicly by Bush, Cheney, Rice and Rumsfeld about the threat Iraq posed to the United States. All the caveats, reservations and dissents made by intelligence were relegated to footnotes and kept from the public. Funny how that worked.

Starting in the fall of 2002 I found a way to vent my frustrations with the neoconservative hijacking of our defense policy. The safe outlet was provided by retired Col. David Hackworth, who agreed to publish my short stories anonymously on his Web site Soldiers for the Truth, under the moniker of "Deep Throat: Insider Notes From the Pentagon." The "deep throat" part was his idea, but I was happy to have a sense that there were folks out there, mostly military, who would be interested in the secretary of defense-sponsored insanity I was witnessing on almost a daily basis. When I was particularly upset, like when I heard Zinni called a "traitor," I wrote about it in articles like this one.

[...]

I shared some of my concerns with a civilian who had been remotely acquainted with the Luti-Feith-Perle political clan in his previous work for one of the senior Pentagon witnesses during the Iran-Contra hearings. He told me these guys were engaged in something worse than Iran-Contra. I was curious but he wouldn't tell me anything more. I figured he knew what he was talking about. I thought of him when I read much later about the 2002 and 2003 meetings between Michael Ledeen, Reuel Marc Gerecht and Iranian arms dealer Manucher Ghorbanifar -- all Iran-Contra figures.

Seems damaging, even if it isn't damning.

BlackGriffen

[zigzag]

It has always seemed to me that her basic assertion that the intelligence was cherry-picked and over-sold should have been self-evident to any politically astute person. It's both gratifying and discomforting to see it corroborated in detail, not that she's the first. And Cheney is still going around spreading misinformation.

Let's review: Powell says Iraq is being contained, then Bush says Iraq poses an urgent if not imminent WMD threat, then no WMDs are found. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see a disconnect in the middle.

We'll soon be reminded that Clinton and many others also thought Saddam had WMD. The politically astute will observe that Clinton didn't invade Iraq.

It may be that invading was the right thing to do, for other reasons. But we should've been honest about them.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
... We'll soon be reminded that Clinton and many others also thought Saddam had WMD...

As if that's somehow irrelevant.

... The politically astute will observe that, unlike Bush, Clinton et al. didn't invade Iraq...

A politically astute person would realize that maybe that wasn't to Clinton's credit.

[tie]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
A politically astute person would realize that maybe that wasn't to Clinton's credit.

Er, I suppose you're being sarcastic?

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
As if that's somehow irrelevant.

I didn't say it was irrelevant - I said that he didn't invade Iraq. The relevance is that, based on similar information, the two made different judgments.

A politically astute person would realize that maybe that wasn't to Clinton's credit.

Perhaps - I allowed that that remains to be seen, although the same could be said of Bush I, and it also appears that Clinton's bombing raids had the desired effect. Be that as it may, I've always allowed that there might be a variety of good reasons for an invasion, a weapons threat being one of them. I nonetheless believe that the administration deliberately exaggerated the WMD threat.

[zachs]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
As if that's somehow irrelevant.

It is irrelevant, because Clinton never invaded Iraq.

A politically astute person would realize that maybe that wasn't to Clinton's credit.

Or maybe it was. Seeing as how Iraq apparently did destroy its weapons in the early 90's, since none have been found.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
... Perhaps - I allowed that that remains to be seen, although the same could be said of Bush I...

Yes, and? That WAS said countless times about Bush I.

... and it also appears that Clinton's bombing raids had the desired effect...

So why did the Clinton admin finally decide regime change was neccessary?

[angaq0k]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Yes, and? That WAS said countless times about Bush I.So why did the Clinton admin finally decide regime change was neccessary?

Why was it necessary again?

And why not before that?

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
As if that's somehow irrelevant.

It is very relevant to those screaming Bush was just making this up and lying.

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by zachs:
It is irrelevant, because Clinton never invaded Iraq.

No he just bombed them, and then let Saddam and his sons go about their business of killing and raping.

He is a much better person for it too I am sure.

[gadster]

Originally posted by Zimphire:
No he just bombed them, and then let Saddam and his sons go about their business of killing and raping.

He is a much better person for it too I am sure.

Are you suggesting that the Preznat of the USA, at any given time, is charged with the responsibility of ensuring every single two-bit State around the world is run in a particular manner?? I think you'll find there are people around the world who would violently resist such a suggestion. And I doubt you'll find such a suggestion in your Constitution. If I'm wrong, you show me where it says this.

The Preznat is elected to run the US, not the world. By your twisted logic, and I use the term advisedly, GW is responsible for the behaviour of Kim Jong Il and his immediate family?

Seriously.

[zachs]

Originally posted by Zimphire:
No he just bombed them, and then let Saddam and his sons go about their business of killing and raping.

He is a much better person for it too I am sure.

Since when was Saddam's (undoubtable) brutality a reason for the war?
All I heard about pre-war was about Saddam's weapons.

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Yes, and? That WAS said countless times about Bush I.So why did the Clinton admin finally decide regime change was neccessary?

Everyone wanted a regime change - that's not the question. The question is: did the present administration deliberately exaggerate the WMD threat? I'm trying to stick to that question.

As I already said, even if the invasion was justified for a variety of reasons (and even if other administrations wanted a regime change), it's still possible that this administration deliberately exaggerated the WMD threat. I believe that it did, and I said so at the time even though I supported the invasion in principle for other reasons.

Just because I might endorse a given strategy or policy doesn't mean I believe everything that comes out of a politician's mouth. If even half the things that a George Bush or a John Kerry said were the whole truth, I'd consider it a promising day.

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by gadster:
Are you suggesting that the Preznat of the USA, at any given time, is charged with the responsibility of ensuring every single two-bit State around the world is run in a particular manner??

Nope, not at all. But we had already put interest in Iraq/Kuwait. We couldn't back out now.

I think you'll find there are people around the world who would violently resist such a suggestion. And I doubt you'll find such a suggestion in your Constitution. If I'm wrong, you show me where it says this.

Good thing I never made such a suggestion.

The Preznat is elected to run the US, not the world. By your twisted logic, and I use the term advisedly, GW is responsible for the behaviour of Kim Jong Il and his immediate family?

Seriously.

But that is the thing. You just projected a ideal onto me (The president is responsible of ensuring safety to every nation) which I do not agree with, and then went on to tell me how I was wrong for thinking that way.

Good job.

[gadster]

Originally posted by Zimphire:

Nope, not at all. But we had already put interest in Iraq/Kuwait. We couldn't back out now.
[/b] Good thing I never made such a suggestion.


But that is the thing. You just projected a ideal onto me (The president is responsible of ensuring safety to every nation) which I do not agree with, and then went on to tell me how I was wrong for thinking that way.

Good job. [/B]

No. I was simply responding to your previous assertion that somehow Clinton - your President at the time - was responsible for the actions of Saddam Hussein's immediate family, which is patently ridiculous.

So by the same logic, Bush is responsible for Kin Jong Il's family. See the parallel?

Given your interest in projection etc. perhaps you should go do Psych 101 and learn a few more big words. Like: sublimation. That'd do you good.

Meanwhile, it's 5.41 am, I'm going to bed. Goodnight for now, but I'll be back.

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by gadster:
No. I was simply responding to your previous assertion that somehow Clinton - your President at the time - was responsible for the actions of Saddam Hussein's immediate family, which is patently ridiculous.

Again, good thing I never made such a statement.

Why do you keep on doing this?

Do you just make up stuff to argue about?

[clt2]

Originally posted by Zimphire:
No he just bombed them, and then let Saddam and his sons go about their business of killing and raping.

He certainly did.

[medmuse]

Originally posted by gadster

No. I was simply responding to your previous assertion that somehow Clinton - your President at the time - was responsible for the actions of Saddam Hussein's immediate family, which is patently ridiculous.

Reply by Zimphire:

Again, good thing I never made such a statement.

Why do you keep on doing this?

Do you just make up stuff to argue about?

Why yes, I believe he does.

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by clt2:
He certainly did.

That isn't saying that Clinton is responsible for their actions. Clinton is responsible for his own.

If you have ever read any of my posts about responsibilities, you will know I say only YOU are responsible for YOUR actions.

Clinton however can be blamed on not stopping it when he should have. So can Bush Sr for that matter.

That is NOT blaming Saddam's actions on Clinton OR Bush Sr..

Sorry, that top don't spin here.

[clt2]

Originally posted by Zimphire:
That isn't saying that Clinton is responsible for their actions.

<zimphire>good thing I never said it was</zimphire>

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by clt2:
<zimphire>good thing I never said it was</zimphire>

And where did I say you said it?

Try again

[clt2]

Originally posted by Zimphire:
And where did I say you said it?

I didn't say you said I said it.

Around we go

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
Everyone wanted a regime change - that's not the question...

Yes everyone did (but not everyone was willing to actually do anything about it). And the reason WHY the Clinton admin supported regime change was because of WMDs. That's also the reason they sent cruise missles into Iraq. But forgetting this makes it easier for you to assert that the Bush admin was guilty of hyping the threat.

[Zimphire]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Yes everyone did (but not everyone was willing to actually do anything about it). And the reason WHY the Clinton admin supported regime change was because of WMDs. That's also the reason they sent cruise missles into Iraq. But forgetting this makes it easier for you to assert that the Bush admin was guilty of hyping the threat.

I've seen dems try to rationalize this is some of the spinniest spins I have ever seen. It's actually quite humorous.

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Yes everyone did (but not everyone was willing to actually do anything about it). And the reason WHY the Clinton admin supported regime change was because of WMDs. That's also the reason they sent cruise missles into Iraq. But forgetting this makes it easier for you to assert that the Bush admin was guilty of hyping the threat.

As I've said 2-3 times now, the question of whether the Bush administration exaggerated the WMD threat can be addressed independently of the other questions. One could support the policy and at the same time conclude that the administration exaggerated the degree and urgency of the WMD threat. I can't tell if you disagree with my conclusion (which is your prerogative) or if you're simply unwilling to concede that the administration is capable of political manipulation (which IMO would be hopelessly naive).

[Zimphire]

One could say Clinton exaggerated Iraq's threat too.

"Saddam Hussein had used biological weapons against his own people -- and would likely use the weapons again unless he were prevented from doing so."

"Hussein, said the president, "threatens the security of all the rest of us.""

"It is obvious that there is an attempt here based on the whole history of this (weapons inspections) operation since 1991 to protect whatever remains of his capacity to produce weapons of mass destruction, the missiles to deliver them and the feedstock necessary to produce them," Clinton said."

"Clinton said Iraq still posed a threat to the national security of the United States and the "freedom-loving world."

"Clinton, who has ordered military forces to the gulf region in case a military strike is needed, warned Hussein not to continue to delay or oppose the U.N. demands on weapons inspections: "He, and he alone, will be to blame for the consequences."

Almost sound like Bush word for word.

How much you wanna bet no one in here called him a liar. Or said he was exaggerating the truth.

I know I didn't.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
As I've said 2-3 times now, the question of whether the Bush administration exaggerated the WMD threat can be addressed independently of the other questions...

What the Clinton admin believed about WMDs in Iraq ISN'T another question!!!! You act like the Bush admin's policy should have been formed in a perfect vacuum uninformed by the previous admin's conclusions.

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
What the Clinton admin believed about WMDs in Iraq ISN'T another question!!!! You act like the Bush admin's policy should have been formed in a perfect vacuum uninformed by the previous admin's conclusions.

I think that mischaracterizes my position and continues to avoid the question raised by the thread, i.e. whether the Bush administration cherry-picked the WMD intel in order to garner support for a full-scale invasion. You appear to disbelieve the intelligence officer's account, while I think the totality of the evidence lends it a degree of credibility. We'll just have to disagree about it, which is fine.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
I think that mischaracterizes my position and continues to avoid the question raised by the thread....

I haven't mischaracterized your position. You are the one one is trying to divorce what the Clinton admin said about WMDs from what the Bush admin said. You started from the position that the Bush admin is guilty and worked your way backwards. YOU are guilty of the very thing you are accusing the Bush admin - cherry-picking the evidence. This article from Salon makes the case you want to make. What Clinton said about Iraq and WMDs undermines your case so you don't want to talk about that.

[Spliffdaddy]

^ word up.

he went from someone whose opinion I respect, to yet another senseless anti-Dubya activist.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by Spliffdaddy:
^ word up.

he went from someone whose opinion I respect, to yet another senseless anti-Dubya activist.

zigzag's more partisan than he pretends to be. I don't have a problem with the partisan part. It's the pretending that's annoying.

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
I haven't mischaracterized your position. You are the one one is trying to divorce what the Clinton admin said about WMDs from what the Bush admin said. You started from the position that the Bush admin is guilty and worked your way backwards. YOU are guilty of the very thing you are accusing the Bush admin - cherry-picking the evidence. This article from Salon makes the case you want to make. What Clinton said about Iraq and WMDs undermines your case so you don't want to talk about that.

Wow - apparently (according to spliffdaddy) I'm now a senseless Bush-basher because I see nuances in the political arena. I'm capable of supporting a general strategy while questioning some of the rhetoric and some of the methods used to advance it. Apparently one must see the world in binary terms, pledge allegiance to one side or the other, and swallow (or gainsay) everything a given political leader says in order to be taken seriously. If that's the case, I'm happy to lose the respect of posters on both sides.

I don't claim to be non-partisan, I only claim to be willing to consider that almost every issue is multi-faceted. I consider the different facets and then draw a conclusion, which of course will be partisan, and might also be incorrect. On the issue of Iraq, I've defended Bush's actions and resolve in many respects - you can look it up. I've said more than once that I believe he made the decision to invade in good faith, and that even if the venture fails, I respect the fact that he felt compelled to take risks, as political leaders must often do. I've said repeatedly that I believe the administration had a variety of reasons for taking action, even if I think it fudged the public presentation. I've expressed high regard for people on both sides of the issue, including Paul Wolfowitz, who I believe has been unusually forthright. I've posted the articles of Paul Berman, a leftist hawk. I've also repeatedly said that history may prove Bush's strategy to be the right one, in which case he may well be remembered as a great leader. Etc.

But apparently that's not enough for some - apparently, unless one swallows everything the administration says and does, one is a "Bush basher." Apparently it's unacceptable to so much as question the administration's rhetoric or methods. Apparently it's a no-no to have moderate, flexible, nuanced views. Sorry, I don't buy it.

It's funny - all I've done is concur with observations of some very respected public figures, (including, I dare say, General Colin Powell and George H. W. Bush in their private moments, although this is based on third-hand reports), and I'm a "Bush basher." OK, whatever.

As for Clinton, I haven't disputed anything you've said about him. He appears to have overestimated the Iraq threat as well - just about everyone did. But I do see meaningful differences in the amount, intensity, urgency and content of his rhetoric as opposed to this administration's rhetoric, and obvious differences in their respective responses to the problem. The differences have been cataloged here and elsewhere ad nauseum, so I'm not going to repeat them, and it wouldn't serve any purpose anyway because you obviously perceive things differently than I do, which is fine. But I've drawn certain conclusions based on the evidence I've seen (that's still my right, isn't it?) and will continue to discuss them even if it offends people who seem to think that any criticism of the Bush Administration is unacceptable.

[daimoni]

.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
... I don't claim to be non-partisan, I only claim to be willing to consider that almost every issue is multi-faceted...

Except you didn't. When someone writes about neo-conservatives capturing our foreign policy where the hell is the nuance? And the Clinton admin's assessment of Iraq certainly seems to me to a facet worth considering. After all, they can't conveniently be labeled neo-conservative.

More facets: besides the Bush and Clinton admins there were others who also believed Iraq had WMDs. From David Kay's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 01/28/2004:

... Let me begin by saying, we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here...

I would also point out that many governments that chose not to support this war -- certainly, the French president, [Jacques] Chirac, as I recall in April of last year, referred to Iraq's possession of WMD.

The Germans certainly -- the intelligence service believed that there were WMD...

And of course, in 1998 the UN also said Saddam had WMDs.

... As for Clinton, I haven't disputed anything you've said about him. He appears to have overestimated the Iraq threat as well - just about everyone did. But I do see meaningful differences in the amount, intensity, urgency and content of his rhetoric as opposed to this administration's rhetoric, and obvious differences in their respective responses to the problem...

The difference being the World Trade Center was still standing when Clinton made his remarks. The stakes were raised with 9/11. The margin for error was removed.

Again from David Kay's testimony:

... I think the aim -- and certainly the aim of what I've tried to do since leaving -- is not political and certainly not a witch hunt at individuals. It's to try to direct our attention at what I believe is a fundamental fault analysis that we must now examine.

And let me take one of the explanations most commonly given: Analysts were pressured to reach conclusions that would fit the political agenda of one or another administration. I deeply think that is a wrong explanation.

As leader of the effort of the Iraqi Survey Group, I spent most of my days not out in the field leading inspections. It's typically what you do at that level. I was trying to motivate, direct, find strategies.

In the course of doing that, I had innumerable analysts who came to me in apology that the world that we were finding was not the world that they had thought existed and that they had estimated. Reality on the ground differed in advance.

And never -- not in a single case -- was the explanation, "I was pressured to do this." The explanation was very often, "The limited data we had led one to reasonably conclude this. I now see that there's another explanation for it."

And each case was different, but the conversations were sufficiently in depth and our relationship was sufficiently frank that I'm convinced that, at least to the analysts I dealt with, I did not come across a single one that felt it had been, in the military term, "inappropriate command influence" that led them to take that position.

It was not that. It was the honest difficulty based on the intelligence that had -- the information that had been collected that led the analysts to that conclusion.

And you know, almost in a perverse way, I wish it had been undue influence because we know how to correct that.

We get rid of the people who, in fact, were exercising that.

The fact that it wasn't tells me that we've got a much more fundamental problem of understanding what went wrong, and we've got to figure out what was there. And that's what I call fundamental fault analysis.

And like I say, I think we've got other cases other than Iraq. I do not think the problem of global proliferation of weapons technology of mass destruction is going to go away, and that's why I think it is an urgent issue....

(my emphasis)

Finally, I think it's premature to say that Clinton or Bush overestimated the threat. More from David Kay:

... I actually think what we learned during the inspection made Iraq a more dangerous place, potentially, than, in fact, we thought it was even before the war....

We know that terrorists were passing through Iraq. And now we know that there was little control over Iraq's weapons capabilities. I think it shows that Iraq was a very dangerous place. The country had the technology, the ability to produce, and there were terrorist groups passing through the country -- and no central control...

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Except you didn't. When someone writes about neo-conservatives capturing our foreign policy where the hell is the nuance? And the Clinton admin's assessment of Iraq certainly seems to me to a facet worth considering. After all, they can't conveniently be labeled neo-conservative.

You've ignored what I just said and lumped me with others who are more focused on a neocon conspiracy. I understand the temptation to do that - we all do it - but I think a review of my posts would reveal that that has not been my focus. I've been willing to give the administration credit where I think it's due - I'm simply not willing to defend the administration blindly, and am willing to criticize it if I see fit.

Which is not to say that I don't think there's a neocon school of thought - they talk about it themselves - or that there isn't a group of loosely associated people who share and reinforce each other's beliefs and interests. But I recognize that it's just one category among many, like "realist" and "multilateralist," and that there are variations within any school of thought.

More facets: besides the Bush and Clinton admins there were others who also believed Iraq had WMDs. From David Kay's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 01/28/2004:And of course, in 1998 the UN also said Saddam had WMDs.The difference being the World Trade Center was still standing when Clinton made his remarks. The stakes were raised with 9/11. The margin for error was removed.

Again from David Kay's testimonymy emphasis)

Finally, I think it's premature to say that Clinton or Bush overestimated the threat. More from David Kay:

That's all fine, and I've taken it all into account. But I nonetheless come to the conclusion that the Bush administration deliberately overstated the scale and urgency of the threat in order to garner support for a full-scale invasion. I believed it when it was happening and believe it even more now. As I've often said, I don't think it necessarily invalidates the invasion, because there were a variety of reasons for the invasion, but I do think the administration was disingenuous with respect to that particular reason. Even if I supported the administration's policy 100%, I don't blame people who feel that they were misled.

One doesn't even have to compare the rhetoric of the Clinton administration to that of the Bush administration. One can compare the rhetoric of the early Bush administration to the later rhetoric, even though nothing had really changed on the ground in Iraq. As I said in my first post, one has to reconcile Powell's statement that Saddam was being contained to the administration's own later "urgent threat" rhetoric.

It's true that 9/11 changed things, and it's one reason I've been able to endorse aspects of the Bush strategy in principle if not always in practice. But 9/11 didn't itself change anything on the ground in Iraq - it did not make Iraq a more "urgent" threat, especially with inspectors on the ground. I think it's fairly self-evident that the administration made a decision to invade Iraq no matter what and that the WMD threat was characterized as urgent in order to sell the idea. I would have preferred that the administration use a different approach. But as I've said many times, if the mission ultimately succeeds, the WMD controversy will become a footnote.

I recognize that you've drawn different conclusions. That's fine.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by zigzag:
You've ignored what I just said and lumped me with others who are more focused on a neocon conspiracy...

Because that's where the author of this article is focused and you gave her a big thumbs up.

... I'm simply not willing to defend the administration blindly...

Who the hell is asking you to? I'm just looking for some of that nuance you say you're willing to consider.

It's true that 9/11 changed things, and it's one reason I've been able to endorse aspects of the Bush strategy in principle if not always in practice. But 9/11 didn't itself change anything on the ground in Iraq - it did not make Iraq a more "urgent" threat...

It made people less willing to tolerate any threat of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists.

[zigzag]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Because that's where the author of this article is focused and you gave her a big thumbs up.

OK, fair enough. In my first post, I concurred with her "basic assertion." I didn't mean to endorse her every word, but I did find the degree of detail both gratifying (in that it tended to confirm my suspicions - what the hell, I'm human, just trying to be honest) and discomforting. I also noted that she wasn't the first to report such things - I came to my conclusions long ago, based on my own observations and previous reports. But if I came off as endorsing her every word, that wasn't my intent and I would absolutely agree that no report should be taken at face value, including this one. My judgment is, again, based on my perception of the totality of the evidence that I've seen.

To be clear, I would never suggest that the administration simply made it all up. I think we saw a combination of bad intelligence and politicized intelligence.

Who the hell is asking you to? I'm just looking for some of that nuance you say you're willing to consider.

If my statements thus far haven't shown any nuanced thinking, then I don't know what else to say. I have my biases but I think I've demonstrated an ability to consider a variety of points of view, even if I sometimes reach the wrong conclusions, as we all do on occasion.

I suppose it'd be easier for me to say "I hate Bush and all of his neocon cronies" or "Bush is a great leader and would never stretch the truth," but that's not how I think.

It made people less willing to tolerate any threat of WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists.

I understand that and I think it's a valid fear. In fact, I share it, and it's one reason I could support the overthrow in principle. I nonetheless believe that the administration deliberately overstated the urgency and scope of the Iraq threat in order to justify a full-scale invasion at that particular time. As I've often said, these aren't mutually exclusive ideas.

Although I have other reasons to be unhappy with Bush, I hope things go well in Iraq whether it results in his re-election or not. I hope it proves to be the smartest thing anyone's ever done. Unfortunately life is seldom that simple.