[zigzag]

OK, before anybody gets over-excited, this is a link to a recent article by a self-described neoconservative, the use of which term will make some people grouchy. But fear not: it represents a division in so-called neocon thinking, demonstrating that it's not necessarily monolithic or well-defined. So people on both sides of that debate will be both pleased and displeased!

Anyway, it's a response by Frances Fukuyama to a speech of Charles Krautheimer's, and it's getting a lot of attention precisely because it is said to signal a divide among the neocon contingent. I haven't sorted out all the -isms yet, but in a nutshell he seems to contend that the Iraq venture, as executed by the Bush administration, was actually inconsistent with neoconservativism as he views it, and that although it's appropriate for the U.S. to exert power and influence, it needs to be done in a more prudent manner or it will prove self-defeating. At least I think that's his point.

I like it because it represents a more nuanced view and demonstrates that critiquing the administration is not simply a leftist hobby. It also explains why I have, at times, been able to consider myself sympathetic to so-called neocon ideas, but have felt that the administration was going about it wrong.

To read the entire piece, scroll down an inch or so and you'll see that someone has cut and pasted it:

http://yglesias.typepad.com/matthew/....html#comments

A couple of snippets:

"[Krautheimer] . . . defined four different schools of thought on foreign policy: isolationism, liberal internationalism, realism and his own position that he defines as "democratic globalism", a kind of muscular Wilsonianism-minus international institutions-that seeks to use U.S. military supremacy to support U.S. security interests and democracy simultaneously.

Krauthammer is a gifted thinker and his ideas are worth taking seriously for their own sake. But, perhaps more importantly, his strategic thinking has become emblematic of a school of thought that has acquired strong influence inside the Bush Administration foreign policy team and beyond . . .

The 2004 speech is strangely disconnected from reality. Reading Krauthammer, one gets the impression that the Iraq War-the archetypical application of American unipolarity-had been an unqualified success, with all of the assumptions and expectations on which the war had been based fully vindicated. There is not the slightest nod towards the new empirical facts that have emerged in the last year or so: the failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the virulent and steadily mounting anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East, the growing insurgency in Iraq, the fact that no strong democratic leadership had emerged there, the enormous financial and growing human cost of the war, the failure to leverage the war to make progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front, and the fact that America's fellow democratic allies had by and large failed to fall in line and legitimate American actions ex post.

The failure to step up to these facts is dangerous precisely to the neo-neoconservative position that Krauthammer has been seeking to define and justify. As the war in Iraq turns from triumphant liberation to grinding insurgency, other voices-either traditional realists like Brent Scowcroft, nationalist-isolationists like Patrick Buchanan, or liberal internationalists like John Kerry-will step forward as authoritative voices and will have far more influence in defining American post-Iraq War foreign policy. The poorly executed nation-building strategy in Iraq will poison the well for future such exercises, undercutting domestic political support for a generous and visionary internationalism, just as Vietnam did. It did not have to be this way. One can start with premises identical to Krauthammer's, agree wholeheartedly with his critiques of the other three positions, and yet come up with a foreign policy that is very different from the one he lays out. I believe that his strategy simultaneously defines our interests in such a narrow way as to make the neoconservative position indistinguishable from realism, while at the same time managing to be utterly unrealistic in its overestimation of U.S. power and our ability to control events around the world. It is probably too late to reclaim the label "neoconservative" for any but the policies undertaken by the Bush Administration, but it is still worth trying to reformulate a fourth alternative that combines idealism and realism-but in a fashion that can be sustained over the long haul.

*******

Since I have volunteered only to write a critique of the views expressed by Charles Krauthammer and am not myself running for president, I am under no obligation to lay out in depth a positive agenda for American foreign policy that would serve as a substitute. On the other hand, there are elements of a different neoconservative foreign policy that are implicit in what I have said thus far. The United States should understand the need to exercise power in pursuit of both its interests and values, but also to be more prudent and subtle in that exercise. The world's sole superpower needs to remember that its margin of power is viewed with great suspicion around the world and will set off countervailing reactions if that power is not exercised judiciously.

This means, in the first instance, doing the simple work of diplomacy and coalition-building that the Bush Administration seemed reluctant to undertake prior to the Iraq War and not gratuitously to insult the "common opinions of mankind." We do not need to embrace the UN or multilateralism for its own sake, because we somehow believe that such institutions are inherently more legitimate than nation-states. On the other hand, we need likeminded allies to accomplish both the realist and idealist portions of our agenda and should spend much more time and energy cultivating them. The promotion of democracy through all of the available tools at our disposal should remain high on the agenda, particularly with regard to the Middle East. But the United States needs to be more realistic about its nation-building abilities, and cautious in taking on large social-engineering projects in parts of the world it does not understand very well. On the other hand, it is inevitable that we will get sucked into similar projects in the future (for example, after a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime), and we need to be much better prepared."

Some additional commentary from the magazine that published the original piece:

http://www.inthenationalinterest.com...1Fukuyama.html

[BlackGriffen]

Interesting, and frankly good, to see a split in the faction. I was beginning to wonder if being a neoconservative required one to have a serious break with reality.

I'm probably more of a multilateralist, personally, but not for it's own sake so much as it seems like the best way to "keep it friendly." As a baseline, our foreign policy should at worst inspire indifference in our allies except in extreme circumstances. This is simply because it's beneficial to maintain a good relationship with our allies and avoid making enemies whenever possible.

It just seems like basic common sense for any nation to conduct itself in this way.

That is, of course, just the broadest of overviews, but it's the essence of what I aspire to in the foreign policies I support.

BlackGriffen

[vmpaul]

Interesting.

Nice to hear someone acknowledge the need to incorporate the actual situation rather than preceding exclusively on ideology. Whether that gets absorbed into this Administration (in a possible 2nd term) is a big question.

I'm beginning to think all these different position papers (i.e., the original PNAC paper) are about as relevant as a Party platforms. They're nice to have in the background but are almost entirely dependent on events that may or may not happen. I mean, would we be talking about Necons if 9/11 hadn't happened? There wouldn't have been the political climate to invade Afghanistan, let alone Iraq.

I wonder how this is being accepted within that group?

[SimeyTheLimey]

I guess the basic issue I would raise with Fukuyama is what do you do if you invite allies to join in, but they say no, and when your perception of interests and theirs diverge? It seems to me that the alternatives are acting unilaterally, with detrimental effects on your alliances, or not acting, with detrimental effects on your interests. Neither are particularly appealing. Either require choosing the lesser of two evils.

Fukuyama seems to assume that there is some third course, but I think that isn't always the case. At worst, thinking that there must be a third choice becomes nothing more than a retreat into wishful thinking. Sometimes you do have to make the hard decision.

Of course, these is one way to create a third course, and that is to be more flexible with your definition of what is an ally. This has happened with the coalition of the willing. It's hardly a new idea. Up to the Cold War the US maintained no permanent alliances. All of our alliances were ad hoc. So, for example, Japan was an ally in WWI, but an enemy in WW-II. Of course, just because someone isn't an ally doesn't mean they move directly to being an enemy. Since WW-II, however, it seems to have become dogma that allies are permanent, and our Cold War alliances sacrosanct. I think you see the same thinking in the resistance to redeploying troops out of Germany and the reluctance to recognize that Cold War institutions like NATO are past their prime.

So, don't be surprised to see different opinions among political scientists like Fukuyama. These are transitional times and he has been at the forefront of it for a while now. Recall: he wrote the accidental bestseller The End of History back in 1989. However, Fukuyama is very much a theoretical political scientist. He doesn't do day to day politics. Day to day politics tends always to be a little less tidy than the theoretical models.

[zigzag]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
I guess the basic issue I would raise with Fukuyama is what do you do if you invite allies to join in, but they say no, and when your perception of interests and theirs diverge? It seems to me that the alternatives are acting unilaterally, with detrimental effects on your alliances, or not acting, with detrimental effects on your interests. Neither are particularly appealing. Either require choosing the lesser of two evils.

Fukuyama seems to assume that there is some third course, but I think that isn't always the case. At worst, thinking that there must be a third choice becomes nothing more than a retreat into wishful thinking. Sometimes you do have to make the hard decision.

From what I gather, that's going to be the essence of Krautheimer's rebuttal: that Fukuyama raises valid questions but fails to offer a truly viable alternative. I'm not knowledgeable enough to say - I'm basically in favor of what works. I know that Bush and probably Krautheimer would say that it's too early to say whether the current strategy will work, and perhaps they're right, but events thus far haven't inspired my confidence, so I'm sympathetic to Fukuyama's views.

[I never read The End of History, but as I understand it Fukuyama is a classicist by training.]

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by zigzag:
From what I gather, that's going to be the essence of Krautheimer's rebuttal: that Fukuyama raises valid questions but fails to offer a truly viable alternative. I'm not knowledgeable enough to say - I'm basically in favor of what works. I know that Bush and probably Krautheimer would say that it's too early to say whether the current strategy will work, and perhaps they're right, but events thus far haven't inspired my confidence, so I'm sympathetic to Fukuyama's views.

[I never read The End of History, but as I understand it Fukuyama is a classicist by training.]

Yes, I would agree that would be the rebuttal. He really doesn't offer anything substantive on a theoretical level. I think he is just trying to disassociate himself from what he perceives to be a failed implementation. But I think they would be correct to rebut also that it is far too early to judge results.

I don't know much about Fukuyama, but he is a political scientist. One of my professors, then a Soviet expert, told us an amusing story about him. They had adjoining offices when he published The End of History. The book was intended as a scholarly examination of the collapse of the Marxist alternative to capitalism. You know, one of those books that sells at most a couple of thousand coplies. When it became a bestseller and he suddenly became famous, it apparently shocked the heck out of him.

[lil'babykitten]

It's an interesting critique. He certainly picks up on a lot of the structural failures in the neo-conservative plan, especially in his criticism of the whole Iraq issue.

He doesn't offer any alternative to implementing the neo-conservative ideas but, I think you're limited in terms of implementation when you're dealing with such a fundamentally flawed ideology in the first place.

[Timo]

Originally posted by lil'babykitten:
He doesn't offer any alternative to implementing the neo-conservative ideas but, I think you're limited in terms of implementation when you're dealing with such a fundamentally flawed ideology in the first place.

I was just thinking this. Maybe this baby does have to go out with the bathwater.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by Timo:
I was just thinking this. Maybe this baby does have to go out with the bathwater.

No, because the alternatives are discredited. They are:

1. Isolationism (but you can't ignore the world, and it it won't ignore you. The world really is interdependent).

2. Collective Security (AKA Wilsonian Internationalism, or multilateralism) (has been tried. Objectively, it fails because of the free rider problem, and because in practice, countries have different interests that inevitably conflict).

3. Realism (aka Kissingerian realism) (incompatible with a moral foreign policy, and tends to create the problem of blowback).*

4. Imperialism (an extreme form of Realism, with the same problems, only worse).

5. Dictatorship (maybe coupled with imperialism, or isolationism) (No thanks).

6. Just accept the fact that wars of increasing savagery will happen. (Again, no thanks).

7. Just accept that someone sooner or later will kill us, and hope that the next world will be better. (OK if your personal theology lets you accept this, not OK otherwise).


The solution, if there is one, is probably some blend of the more moderate of the above theories. In practice, probably numbers 2 and 3 with an occasional pragmatic number 1. In my view whatever blend you come up with has at least in the long term to include democracy promotion. There is a demonstrated long term value of democracy in promoting well being, and reducing international strife. This is known as Kantian Democratic Peace Theory. It's not a new idea, and unlike a lot of theories in political science, there seems to be normative proof that it works. Western Europe is a pretty good example, but there are others. The problem is that democracy rarely happens by accident and never seems to happen without effort. Hence, it has to be blended in with other theories to get from here to there.


* But note, Realism is first a descriptive theory for how countries in an international system behave. Along with game theory, it correctly predicts that Wilsonian Internationalism and collective security are unreliable. See World War II for details.

[Timo]

No, because the alternatives are discredited.

Simey, I understand you to mean alternatives are not discredited -- you say so yourself, arguing for a blend of (your numbers) 2 and 3, with some choice isolationism to keep the Libertarians from tearing down all the fences.

[And by the way, I imagine there are other stances other than your seven listed. But just between you and me, the effort to go into figuring out what they are is beyond me today.]

Obviously, collective security has its flaws, but the unilateralism implicit in much neo-con reshaping projects is willfully ignorant of the facts on the ground. The article initially quoted describes this well:

Of all of the different views that have now come to be associated with neoconservatives, the strangest one to me was the confidence that the United States could transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go on from there to democratize the broader Middle East. It struck me as strange precisely because these same neoconservatives had spent much of the past generation warning-in The National Interest's former sister publication, The Public Interest, for example-about the dangers of ambitious social engineering, and how social planners could never control behavior or deal with unanticipated consequences. If the United States cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores in Washington, DC, how does it expect to bring democracy to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is virulently anti-American to boot?

Now, a point of contrast. Any victories in collective security are achieved despite the (sometimes very) different agendas of the members of the collective. But there is no such "check" in neo-con land. Instead, in the neo-con world, this first, initial test of realism, test of assumptions and test of how well does the theory fit the world (rather than vice versa) is never aired, with, I think, potentially disasterous consequences. The classic hubris of this outlook is that they would bend the world to match the ideology, rather than see how the world really is.

It's not surprising to me that neo-cons suck at nation building, because the principal power of their position derrives from a critique of situations, an adversarial stance -- something which is, at base, a parasitic project. Marxism, for example, was another critical project that didn't survive its translation into a nation-building concept, and rather simply became the crudest mask for totalitarianism.


Call it philosophical hookum if you must, but nevertheless I assert that meaningful building projects cannot be wrought from the mean and meager materials of these pissy critics. Creation is about vision, and these boys don't have it.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by Timo:
Simey, I understand you to mean alternatives are not discredited -- you say so yourself, arguing for a blend of (your numbers) 2 and 3, with some choice isolationism to keep the Libertarians from tearing down all the fences.

[And by the way, I imagine there are other stances other than your seven listed. But just between you and me, the effort to go into figuring out what they are is beyond me today.]

Obviously, collective security has its flaws, but the unilateralism implicit in much neo-con reshaping projects is willfully ignorant of the facts on the ground. The article initially quoted describes this well:



Now, a point of contrast. Any victories in collective security are achieved despite the (sometimes very) different agendas of the members of the collective. But there is no such "check" in neo-con land. Instead, in the neo-con world, this first, initial test of realism, test of assumptions and test of how well does the theory fit the world (rather than vice versa) never is aired, with, I think, potentially disasterous consequences. The classic hubris of this outlook is that they would bend the world to match the ideology, rather than see how the world really is.

It's not surprising to me that neo-cons suck at nation building, because the principal power of their position derrives from a critique of situations, an adversarial stance -- something which is, at base, a parasitic project. Marxism, for example, was another critical project that didn't survive very well it's translation into a nation-building concept, and rather simply became the crudest mask for totalitarianism.


Call it philosophical hookum if you must, but nevertheless I assert that meaningful building projects cannot be wrought from the mean and meager materials of these pissy critics. Creation is about vision, and these boys don't have it.

I don't want to take this off topic, but just to say for the record that I don't think there really is a coherent school here at all. I'll accept for the sake of argument that there is something out there that people have (rightly or wrongly) labeled neoconservativism. What I take that to mean is what in the 90s and before was I think more accurately called neo-realism. Neo-Realism is more strictly a foreign policy strand of thought and I think it does what I talked about above mixing other theories, taking the best, and discarding the worst. This I think I see reflected in at least what some people who have been labeled as "neoconservatives" have been thinking about. Whatever it is they are doing, it is trying to find an alternative to the discredited ideas of the past. Unfortunately, this seems to be the only alternative at the moment. Most of the critics of this alternative seem to want to return to one of the other theories, and that isn't very smart, imho.

Neo-Realism combines realism (both in its descriptive and normative guises) and blends it with some elements of Wilsonian Internationalism. Specifically, it allows for analysis of the internal driving forces that affect state action such as politics and beaurocratic behavior (Realism tends to ignore these), and sees positive advantages in multilateral organizations. On the other hand, it does not believe in the more idealistic Wilsonian ideals such as collective security because of the demonstrated failures of that ideal. Because it is a blend of ideas, it is open to taking the best of several traditions. So, for example, the Wilsonian ideals that lead the Carter Administration to make human rights a central policy met the Reaganite anti-Communist Realism and were blended into Reagan's democracy promotion policy (originally pioneered by Germans) which was applied by him in Eastern Europe through the National Endowment for Democracy.

That's basically the roots of much of what I see as the long term part of the Bush Doctrine. That's why I am so skeptical of the idea that this new Doctine is something imposed suddenly. All of its ideas were swirling about in previous decades. Different parts of it can be traced through different Administrations and indeed, internationally. But that doesn't mean, of course, that different people don't blend these ideas differently, or don't put the same emphasis on different things. Nor is it all to be regarded as linear as if each element directly supports the other and it is all supposed to be done at once.

The policy of preemption, for example, is very much a short range Realist policy. It can involve, for example, making short term alliances with regimes that are less than savory. The reason is because of the immediate to short term danger of terrorism and WMD armed terrorism. Democracy promotion, on the other hand, is very much more long term. That's the thing you build slowly and gradually. Nobody thinks that a democracy can be imposed or grown overnight. It will take time and patience and no doubt it will happen in fits and starts with setbacks and regressions. But I think it is worth trying because it does have a track record in other places in the world. In some ways, preemption may in the short run impede democracy promotion in the same way that cancer treatment impedes the training program of a future athlete. If you let the cancer grow, the athlete will die so it is better to retard the training to get the treatment. But ideally you wouldn't have the need for cancer treatment and you would just be training. So in once sense the training and the treatment are opposites, but in another they are necessary compliments.

This is what I meant when I said that day to day policy tends to be messier than theory. You have to be ready to do something necessary by inconsistent in the short run, and that is OK, provided that you don't forget your long term policy goals, which in this case, are to work toward building a real community of independent democracies.