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Do you trust electronic voting machines without a paper-trail?
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Mac Elite
Join Date: Apr 2001
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It seems like they are hackable. In Netherland a group of computer-freaks bought such a voting-machine, the same model that is used in the dutch elections without a papertrail, and they were able to replace the installed application with another one, a chess-program, eventhough the manufacturer claimed that to be impossible, and they were also able to install an election-fraud-application, with which they could manipulate election-results at will. Here is a PDF-article detailing that and other leaks and problems with these machines:
http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputer...91/Es3b-en.pdf
What do you think? Is democracy going down the drains at the hand of these machines?
Taliesin
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Clinically Insane
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No, I don't trust them.
There's an old saying: "If it ain't broke, don't fix it". Old-fashioned paper-voting wasn't broken, so no need to fix it with electronics.
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Professional Poster
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Not at all.
Should have been a poll.
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Clinically Insane
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No paper trail = no dice.
Then again, I'm not fond of networking voting machines either. I would rather see voting machines print paper ballots, already filled according to the user's wishes, which the voter then casts in the usual manner. This should combine the potentially-increased accuracy of electronic voting systems with the reliability and verifiability of current methods.
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You are in Soviet Russia. It is dark. Grue is likely to be eaten by YOU!
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Mac Elite
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Originally Posted by Dakar
Should have been a poll.
I hate polls, I'm more interested in opinions and arguments.
Taliesin
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Professional Poster
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Originally Posted by Taliesin
I hate polls, I'm more interested in opinions and arguments.
Taliesin
Fair enough. It is your thread.
I'm not sure I can add more than the obvious. The system isn't very transparent, and in the event of a recount I'd like it if we consulted physical receipts which the voter should have approved before submitting.
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Mac Elite
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My experience is that machines are more reliable than humans.
Seriously, i have no problems with electronic voting. I think people are just afraid of new things. Didn't people say the same thing with electronic banking and payments?
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Clinically Insane
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Originally Posted by yakkiebah
Didn't people say the same thing with electronic banking and payments?
Yep. And now we have problems with identity theft, phishing, data leaks, etc..
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Mac Elite
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Originally Posted by Doofy
Yep. And now we have problems with identity theft, phishing, data leaks, etc..
I don't have any problems. I only have cash with me when i go out for a drink.
Ever heard of robberies or counterfeiting?
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Professional Poster
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There's the old saying attributed to Stalin, which I'm too lazy to look up and will paraphrase:
It's not he who votes that counts, it's he who counts the votes that counts.
I don't necessarily object to the concept of an electronic voting machine, but I agree that there needs to be better accounting of the code running in the machine, as well as some sort of paper trail. We can't really hand out receipts to voters here in the U.S., since it's a secret ballot here. But there ought to be some way to audit the votes after the fact so that a real recount can take place.
Any networking should be confined to networking several voting machines in a room to a central computer (in the same room, in full view of everyone) that will tally votes in addition to the voting machines. All machines should have paper that records every single vote, maybe even on punch tape, and the central computer should record all votes in the same manner. Recounts will involve counting the votes on all the tapes and making sure all numbers match. There's no need to network with any district central office, when a phone call to relay the vote totals will suffice. I just offer punch tape as an example, any true Write-Once-Read-Many form of storage would suffice.
All machines should have their code audited ahead of time by anyone with the means to review it, and all firmware should have md5 hashes (or some other identifying hash) of their entire non-volatile memory recorded and printed periodically during the course of the day on the paper trail. All I/O ports, or any mechanism that could be used to access the machine other than the main voter interface, should be under lock and key (and not a hotel minibar key, either. )
While it is impossible to prevent all tampering, we should construct things so that more than one machine needs to be tampered with, any tampering can be found out about right away, and everything is observable by the public. I find it laughable that the same people who make ATM's are making these voting machines here in the U.S., and these voting machines are so easy to hack. I have never had an ATM record the wrong value in my checking account!
We've had the lever-style voting machines in New York State for quite some time. We were due for an update in this election, but that may have been postponed. If I see a touch-screen machine in my district, I will ask for a paper ballot instead, since I don't trust the current crop of touch-screen machines.
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Last edited by Dork.; Oct 11, 2006 at 09:09 AM.
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I think there needs to be user oversight of the process - so people can be sure their vote is counted and counted accurately.
I don't know how this could be done to make it "hack proof" but I definitely want a printout that I can verify, then submit for a backup count.
I'm just spitballing here since I haven't really thought this out but couldn't some system be created so that each person's ballot looked the same, but the information is scrambled, so a hacker couldn't just change it so that one candidate has an advantage.
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Moderator Emeritus
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It's time once again for Rebecca Mercuri's list of questions that have to be answered before electronic voting systems can be trusted.
Until these questions have been answered, there is no point in using electronic voting machines.
Note: This week the Diebold machine was opened with a 15 year old key to a VAX machine panel. The keys are readily available on the internet for pennies. It's possible to open and thus violate any security inherent in the Diebold voting machine because it was a locked machine.
Voting System Checklists by Rebecca Mercuri
What means is used to separate voter identity from voted ballot?
How is the balloting process secured such that voter submissions can not be observed, or recorded in any way that is traceable to the individual voter?
What actions on the system are audited?
How is the auditing process precluded from associating voters with cast ballots?
How is the audit trail accessed and used?
Who is permitted to access the system (through all aspects of handling)?
What facilities are provided for recount purposes?
How are voters authenticated and authorized to cast ballots?
What access controls are in place to ensure single ballot per voter per election?
If multiple systems are deployed, how are voters tracked so the same person does not vote in different formats?
What controls are used to ensure that the correct ballot is provided to the voter?
What controls are provided to ensure that each ballot item is voted properly?
How are all forms of tampering detected and prevented?
How is vote confirmation provided without ballot-face receipt?
How is the voter prevented from retaining a copy of the cast ballot?
How does the system assure that each ballot has been correctly recorded?
How does the voter know that a cast ballot has been accepted?
How is vote tabulation correctness assured?
What features are employed to ensure operability of the voting system throughout the election?
How are downtimes handled in the event that they do occur?
What alternative balloting system is available for voters when the system is down?
How do the poll workers and system administrators know that the system is operating correctly?
How is the voting system precluded from use when deemed inoperable?
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Addicted to MacNN
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These machines were developed at the direction of the Bush family for the sole purpose of maintaining a religious right stranglehold on America and eventually the world so they can dismantle worldwide democratic regimes and install Christian theocracies.
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Being in debt and celebrating a lower deficit is like being on a diet and celebrating the fact you gained two pounds this week instead of five.
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Clinically Insane
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Electronic Voting Machines could work. The problem is the companies and the motivation behind these machines. They're so blatently corrupt it's disgusting. The only people who seem to object to them are the people. Democratic and Republican representatives are snatching up the machines left and right because they can so easily be manipulated.
The machines can be sucessful if they:
1. Developed and run by a joint-governed, non-affiliated organization.
2. Use a custom, open view*, embedded OS that's designed just for voting. That's it.
3. Install the OS on a write-once ROM with no 3rd party involvement.
4. Mechanical switch checksum verification for the removeable OS ROM to avoid tampering.
5. Dual paper receipt; one for the voter for verification, one for the voting office. Paper receipt will have a barcode and and matching serail number to the electronic vote.
6. Results stored on 3 removeable right-once ROMs. 1 main, 2 backup.
7. Actual device locked in a metal, fire-resistant case, not wood. Locking mechanism is a set 2-key combination. One at the voting office, one at said organization. The actual box will not be opened until after votes have been measured and recorded. Box design is also "open view."
8. Machine does not go home with any particular politician. It will contain GPS for tracking.
9. Machines tracked, then locked in a designated area after polls close. No visitors.
10. Data is downloaded via serial port. No one has access to the inside of the machine or the original ROMs until after voting and counting is completed. If results are in dispute or recount is requested, only then, during public display, are the keys called in, box opened, all 3 ROMs removed and manually downloaded, then the votes tallied again and compared to paper results.
* Open View means that candidates and public officials nominated by the city, county, or state can each send their own experts to view the code before it is finally written to the ROM.
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"…I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than
you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods,
you will understand why I dismiss yours." - Stephen F. Roberts
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Originally Posted by olePigeon
Electronic Voting Machines could work. The problem is the companies and the motivation behind these machines. They're so blatently corrupt it's disgusting. The only people who seem to object to them are the people. Democratic and Republican representatives are snatching up the machines left and right because they can so easily be manipulated.
The machines can be sucessful if they:
1. Developed and run by a joint-governed, non-affiliated organization.
2. Use a custom, open view*, embedded OS that's designed just for voting. That's it.
3. Install the OS on a write-once ROM with no 3rd party involvement.
4. Mechanical switch checksum verification for the removeable OS ROM to avoid tampering.
5. Dual paper receipt; one for the voter for verification, one for the voting office. Paper receipt will have a barcode and and matching serail number to the electronic vote.
6. Results stored on 3 removeable right-once ROMs. 1 main, 2 backup.
7. Actual device locked in a metal, fire-resistant case, not wood. Locking mechanism is a set 2-key combination. One at the voting office, one at said organization. The actual box will not be opened until after votes have been measured and recorded. Box design is also "open view."
8. Machine does not go home with any particular politician. It will contain GPS for tracking.
9. Machines tracked, then locked in a designated area after polls close. No visitors.
10. Data is downloaded via serial port. No one has access to the inside of the machine or the original ROMs until after voting and counting is completed. If results are in dispute or recount is requested, only then, during public display, are the keys called in, box opened, all 3 ROMs removed and manually downloaded, then the votes tallied again and compared to paper results.
* Open View means that candidates and public officials nominated by the city, county, or state can each send their own experts to view the code before it is finally written to the ROM.
I don't see how anyone could argue with OlePigeon's concepts. They are valid and well thought out.
If the goal is, truly, to count the votes correctly and accurately while making voting easier for everyone who is eligible, then we'd do something like this.
The fact is, both sides want to manipulate the system to their advantage.
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Clinically Insane
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The question seems to assume I trust paper ballots more if I say no.
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Chuck
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"Instead of either 'multi-talented' or 'multitalented' use 'bisexual'."
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Originally Posted by Chuckit
The question seems to assume I trust paper ballots more if I say no.
You think they're equally untrustworthy?
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Clinically Insane
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If we can't trust the people administering the polls, then we are screwed whether there is a paper trail for them to forge or not.
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Chuck
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"Instead of either 'multi-talented' or 'multitalented' use 'bisexual'."
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Professional Poster
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To me it depends on which one it easier to commit fraud with. If you're more likely to get caught committing fraud with paper ballots, then that's the way to go.
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Originally Posted by Dakar
To me it depends on which one it easier to commit fraud with. If you're more likely to get caught committing fraud with paper ballots, then that's the way to go.
We need the most accurate and reliable count possible.
Anything that involves humans counting it can be messed up. We just need a way to verify every vote's intent if the machine crashes or something.
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Originally Posted by davesimondotcom
We need the most accurate and reliable count possible.
Anything that involves humans counting it can be messed up. We just need a way to verify every vote's intent if the machine crashes or something.
I like milleniums idea of inputing your choices through a computer which then prints the results in a clean unmistakable manner.
The we can scantron the votes like when I was back in high school!
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Originally Posted by davesimondotcom
I don't see how anyone could argue with OlePigeon's concepts. They are valid and well thought out.
If the goal is, truly, to count the votes correctly and accurately while making voting easier for everyone who is eligible, then we'd do something like this.
The fact is, both sides want to manipulate the system to their advantage.
I can argue with OlePigeon's concepts.
They don't answer well enough Mercuri's questions I linked to and quoted in part.
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Posting Junkie
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If Democrats do well in the November elections you won't hear anything about voter fraud or hacked Diebold machines.
If Republicans do well in the November elections then all you'll hear is speculation that there was rampant voter fraud and all the Diebold machines were hacked.
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Clinically Insane
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Originally Posted by vmarks
I can argue with OlePigeon's concepts.
They don't answer well enough Mercuri's questions I linked to and quoted in part.
Your post wasn't visible before I posted, but I agree those are very valid points. Maybe I'll modify my list to include those and cover them.
I guess I was just pointing out aspects of a voting machine completely contrary to Diebold's. Seriously, they use a 10-year-old slide-lock & key that anyone can buy over the internet, with tamper proof tape that's not tamper proof when all you need is a pocketknife.
Originally Posted by Spliffdaddy
If Democrats do well in the November elections you won't hear anything about voter fraud or hacked Diebold machines.
If Republicans do well in the November elections then all you'll hear is speculation that there was rampant voter fraud and all the Diebold machines were hacked.
I don't want people using Diebold, period! I don't know how the arguments will fold out, you're probably right, but either side will just hack up their machines to ensure victory in whatever county. I hate the very concept. I just don't understand how Diebold can get away with it.
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"…I contend that we are both atheists. I just believe in one fewer god than
you do. When you understand why you dismiss all the other possible gods,
you will understand why I dismiss yours." - Stephen F. Roberts
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Moderator Emeritus
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Originally Posted by olePigeon
Your post wasn't visible before I posted, but I agree those are very valid points. Maybe I'll modify my list to include those and cover them.
I guess I was just pointing out aspects of a voting machine completely contrary to Diebold's. Seriously, they use a 10-year-old slide-lock & key that anyone can buy over the internet, with tamper proof tape that's not tamper proof when all you need is a pocketknife.
I agree that the result needs to be contrary to Diebold's current work, but I think using Mercuri's questions as the guide will assure better results. I also think you need to re-think the technical details of using write-once roms to store the votes- you'll write it once for the first vote, and it will be written and now read only.
I don't want people using Diebold, period! I don't know how the arguments will fold out, you're probably right, but either side will just hack up their machines to ensure victory in whatever county. I hate the very concept. I just don't understand how Diebold can get away with it.
Very simple. They're a big name, have big business doing ATMs, and no one has ever been fired for buying stuff from them, yet.
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