[thunderous_funker]

2 major themes to this thread:

1. The relative merits of either traditional mindset of American foreign policy

2. the ideological influences that shaped both

Begin:

For background on The Bush Doctrine consider basic intro. Feel free to add depth as you see fit.

For background on The Powell Doctrine consider this article he wrote in '92

[thunderous_funker]

I found an article that many consider one of the most formative and influential on policies that would largely shape The Bush Doctrine.

It was written by William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996. It hits on all the major theme of a vision of the US as global "benevolent hegemon".

Read it here.

Interestingly enough, another article was written by Walter McDougal as a specific rebuttal to the above article. It take the neocon arguments head on. Read it here.

These two offer a unique head to head presentation to contrast and compare some of the major themes. Enjoy.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Picky point, but the Powell Doctrine actually is not the Powell Doctrine (as he has repeatedly pointed out). The Powell Doctrine is really the Weinberger Doctrine. It was coined by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984.

The basic points are:

*Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk;

*The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning";

*We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives;

*We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate;

*There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support;

*Force should be used only as a last resort.

PBS

I don't see anything particularly inconsistent between this and the Bush Doctrine. It's just a checklist intended to prevent another incrementalist war like Vietnam.

[petehammer]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
I don't see anything particularly inconsistent between this and the Bush Doctrine. It's just a checklist intended to prevent another incrementalist war like Vietnam.

Really?

Okay, let's look at your examples:

Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk

Bush policy: seems to alienate its close allies.

The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning"

Okay, in agreement.

We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives

Well, as I'm sure you know, I disagree. Bush wanted the war in Iraq and Powell was quite hesitant. And he was hesitant because there were not clear objectives. WMD? Saddam? Humanitarian? WoT? What's the reason this week.

We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate

It seems like for Bush, war was the only answer to Iraq.

There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support

Congressional, sure. Public... maybe. International... no.

Force should be used only as a last resort.

And here it is. Powell, a military man, understands the necessity of other options before force. Bush, AWOL, wishes he had SOCOM II. There is truly a fundamental difference here. For one, might may be necessary. For the other, might makes right.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by petehammer:
Really?

Okay, let's look at your examples:

Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk

Bush policy: seems to alienate its close allies.

Do you see the "or"? It's not United States' and its close allies, it is United States' OR its close allies.

The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning"

Okay, in agreement.

We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives

Well, as I'm sure you know, I disagree. Bush wanted the war in Iraq and Powell was quite hesitant. And he was hesitant because there were not clear objectives. WMD? Saddam? Humanitarian? WoT? What's the reason this week.

No, you misunderstand. This isn't about the reason to go in, its about how you know when to get out. You have to have some idea of what constitutues victory. In this case, it is measured by political developments in the Middle East, as well as measured by terrorist capabilities. In the case of Iraq, it is simply when Iraq is ready for self-government without the threat of anarchy or a return to Ba'athist rule. In other words, when we have won the peace.

We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate

It seems like for Bush, war was the only answer to Iraq.

I don't think Weinberger meant quit after 6 months. But in principal, you make reassessments.

There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support

Congressional, sure. Public... maybe. International... no.

Where did you get "international" from? You added that. Weinberger certainly never would have allowed US policy to be contingent on allies.

COngress does support the war in Iraq, so does a solid majority of the US public.

Force should be used only as a last resort.

And here it is. Powell, a military man, understands the necessity of other options before force. [/B]

These aren't Powell's points, they are Caspar Weinberger's. Powell worked as his assistant. Weinberger wasn't against the use of force, he just wanted it done deliberately. He's also still alive and I haven't heard him say anything critical about the war in Afghanistan or Iraq.

However, Kosovo would have failed the Weinberger Doctrine because no US vital national interests were at stake, nor those of any of our allies.

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
Picky point, but the Powell Doctrine actually is not the Powell Doctrine (as he has repeatedly pointed out). The Powell Doctrine is really the Weinberger Doctrine. It was coined by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1984.

The basic points are:

*Either the United States' or its close allies' vital national interests had to be at risk;

*The war had to be fought "wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning";

*We should employ decisive force in the pursuit of clearly defined political and military objectives;

*We must constantly reassess whether the use of force is necessary and appropriate;

*There must be a "reasonable assurance" of Congressional and public support;

*Force should be used only as a last resort.

PBS

I don't see anything particularly inconsistent between this and the Bush Doctrine. It's just a checklist intended to prevent another incrementalist war like Vietnam.

Good points. But I think you omitted the more tempestuous elements of The Bush Doctrine. Namely:

1) pre-emptive war and all the grey area surrounding "imminent" threats

2) an official policy of preventing any challenge to our position of military supremacy--even amongst allies.

3) that military force is an appropriate means to open free markets

While many might consider #1 only a minor tweaking of traditional notions of sef-defense, I think the contentious element lies in how we assess threats and what checks to executive power should be appropriate to prevent misuse of such awesome power.

#2 is the most notable element that is clearly drawn from a decade of neoconservative policy papers and marks the most dramatic, IMO, shift from traditional attitudes of Internationalism. All idea of detterent, alliances and strength is numbers is thrown out with a total committment to the US being "world cop" first and foremost. Not NATO, not the UN. Just the Pentagon.

#3 is not explicitly a result of the new policy, but I think it is clearly an implicit conclusion. Not only is the US now going to be in the business of exporting "security" and "democracy" around the world by sheer militarism, but we are going to dictate market policy with the Pentagon as well. Not only is that kind of "what's good for America is good for the world" terrifically confrontational and ultimately counter-productive, IMO, but under the surface what it really indicates is the fundamental belief that "what is good for US multinationals is good for everyone." Not only should that idea be offensive to every industrialized nation on Earth, but it should be equally offensive to American labor.

[thunderous_funker]

As an interesting side-note, quite a few of the neocons are the people that are often called "chickenhawks" by their critics. Behind the vitriol is the basic observation that very few, if any, of them have a background of military service or have children in military service.

The Weinberger/Powell camp, OTOH, is loaded with veterans of some of the country's most brutal wars. Its not coicindental that these ideas became known as the Powell Doctrine despite their earlier origin. For many poeple, his undeniably stellar military record and bulletproof reputation as a soldier lent a lot of clout to these ideas so its only natural that it would be branded after him rather than the less charismatic Weinberger.

I find much of the neocon vision to be very militaristic. The ideas of "benevolent global hegemon" or that we should be "fighting monsters" around the globe in particular. Its sort of a blending of American exceptionalism and patriotism-bordering-on-nationalism.

As some of their critics have pointed out, their willingness to plunge the US into endless military campaigns around the globe in pursuit of High Ideals seems to stem from the fact that none of them quite know the horror of war first hand. Nor are they the ones that are making the ultimate sacrifice--monetarily nor militarily. Someone else pays for the wars and someone else's kids do all the dying.

That may sound quite harsh, but a lot of this kind of badgering does and has gone back and forth between neocons and their critics. I find the personalities behind the ideas quite interesting in this respect. I find Powell almost Dovish in his insistance on rigorous diplomacy and multilateralism. Often times my reaction to various strategy papers from neocons strike me as someone looking at a global game of Risk or Stratego, passionately marshalling forces here and there in some kind of supernatural battle of good and evil.

Perhaps that's influence of the Trotskyite revolutionary element of early personalities in the neoconservative camp. Maybe its the Straussian influence.

I've read some critics of neocons that actually describe them as a "Messianic War Cult". Obviously that's a darkly satirical attack, but I must admit that some of the stuff almost reads like that. That is, it takes almost a rather abstract, literary view of life and death in conflict.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
I found an article that many consider one of the most formative and influential on policies that would largely shape The Bush Doctrine.

It was written by William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996. It hits on all the major theme of a vision of the US as global "benevolent hegemon".

Read it here.

Interestingly enough, another article was written by Walter McDougal as a specific rebuttal to the above article. It take the neocon arguments head on. Read it here.

These two offer a unique head to head presentation to contrast and compare some of the major themes. Enjoy.

Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan aren't neocons. Note how their article describes their foreign policy proposals as "neo-Reaganite". I'd say that's a better term. This label "neocon" is very dated. Bill Kristol's father is/was a neo-conservative. Neocons were leftists who gradually moved to the right. Bill Kristol was always on the right.

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
Bill Kristol and Robert Kagan aren't neocons. Note how their article describes their foreign policy proposals as "neo-Reaganite". I'd say that's a better term. This label "neocon" is very dated. Bill Kristol's father is/was a neo-conservative. Neocons were leftists who gradually moved to the right. Bill Kristol was always on the right.

Many people regard that article a "manifesto" of the newest breed of neoconservativism. That certainly wasn't lost on McDougal who clearly considers their ideas of the neoconservative refrain in his rebuttal to their article.

I'll agree that the term is broader than the particular groups that are most often associated with it today. And like most ideologies it has gone through some various transformations. Are Perle and Wolfowitz the same as Irving Kristol? No, but I think the intellectual tradition is shared and related.

I'd rather not get off on the semantics of "neoconservatives" or "liberals" or "conservatives" for that matter. Its a very minor point.

Kagan is one of the founders of PNAC which puts him squarely in the same camp as Perle, Wolfowitz, Cheney and others who certainly do not shy away from their neoconservative credentials.

I don't use the term pejoratively (as exhaustively argued in the other thread). Simply as shorthand for a broad political movement or attitude. I think its a useful term as it captures the conservative tradition of Reagan, but certainly differentiates it from other forms of conservativism--just as the Reaganites were at odds with other conservatives whom they called "neoisolationsist". Just as there are liberals and neoliberals, Keynesians and neo-Keynesians, classical and neo-classical....etc.

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
Many people regard that article a "manifesto" of the newest breed of neoconservativism. That certainly wasn't lost on McDougal who clearly considers their ideas of the neoconservative refrain in his rebuttal to their article...

I found McDougal's comments to be rather thin-skinned. Did he really think Kristol and Kagan wre taking a "slap" at Adams? And it's not unfair to criticize the Nixon-Kissinger worldview. Yes, the situation in the mid-70's was different from what Reagan inherited but Nixon had a role in shaping that deteriorated geo-political reality. And when Reagan came along the Soviet Union was pretty much at it's zenith - not exactly an enviable position for a new president to encounter. Reagan was no less challenged by the circumstances of his day than were Nixon and Kissinger.

I'll agree that the term is broader than the particular groups that are most often associated with it today...

Actually my point is that it's narrower. For example: how and when did Rumsfeld and Cheney becme neocons? Yes, their views are different from those of Powell, et al, but that doesn't mean they're neo-conservatives. They both had had prominent jobs in the Ford admin and had served in Congress when the neocons first started showing up. They were thinking about these issues long beofre the influence of the neo-con crowd began to be felt. I just think the term obfuscates more than it illumines.

I don't use the term pejoratively...

So why use the term "chickenhawk"? Sorry, I don't believe you.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
As an interesting side-note, quite a few of the neocons are the people that are often called "chickenhawks" by their critics. Behind the vitriol is the basic observation that very few, if any, of them have a background of military service or have children in military service.

The Weinberger/Powell camp, OTOH, is loaded with veterans of some of the country's most brutal wars. Its not coicindental that these ideas became known as the Powell Doctrine despite their earlier origin. For many poeple, his undeniably stellar military record and bulletproof reputation as a soldier lent a lot of clout to these ideas so its only natural that it would be branded after him rather than the less charismatic Weinberger.

I find much of the neocon vision to be very militaristic. The ideas of "benevolent global hegemon" or that we should be "fighting monsters" around the globe in particular. Its sort of a blending of American exceptionalism and patriotism-bordering-on-nationalism.

As some of their critics have pointed out, their willingness to plunge the US into endless military campaigns around the globe in pursuit of High Ideals seems to stem from the fact that none of them quite know the horror of war first hand. Nor are they the ones that are making the ultimate sacrifice--monetarily nor militarily. Someone else pays for the wars and someone else's kids do all the dying.

That may sound quite harsh, but a lot of this kind of badgering does and has gone back and forth between neocons and their critics. I find the personalities behind the ideas quite interesting in this respect. I find Powell almost Dovish in his insistance on rigorous diplomacy and multilateralism. Often times my reaction to various strategy papers from neocons strike me as someone looking at a global game of Risk or Stratego, passionately marshalling forces here and there in some kind of supernatural battle of good and evil.

Perhaps that's influence of the Trotskyite revolutionary element of early personalities in the neoconservative camp. Maybe its the Straussian influence.

I've read some critics of neocons that actually describe them as a "Messianic War Cult". Obviously that's a darkly satirical attack, but I must admit that some of the stuff almost reads like that. That is, it takes almost a rather abstract, literary view of life and death in conflict.

I disagree with a couple of pretty major points here. I think you are making completely the wrong comparisn.

First, Weinberger was hardly dovish. The Reagan Administration was not afraid to use military force. Weinberger's concern was mainly that military force should be used as a part of a national strategy. His doctrine was a reaction mainly to the surruptitious use of force associated with Robert MacNamara in Vietnam. As well as some political criteria, the Weinberger Doctrine is most noted for its insistance that force when used should be overwhelming. In Vietnam, the use of force was slowly ramped up in what was dubbed incrementalism. The US really never brought its full weight to bear, and people like Weinberger saw the eventual defeat as being a result of this.

If you want to make some more recent comparisons, you could compare desert Storm with Kosovo. Kosovo was incrementalist. Desert Storm was a sledgehammer. Desert Storm was Colin Powell's implementation of the Weinberger Doctrine.

That illustrates my second objection. Powell is not nearly as dovish as some like to think he is. His current perceived dovishness is mainly a function of his office. He's the Secretary of State. Dovishness comes with the institutional territory.

If you want to compare the Bush Doctrine with anything, the proper comparison really isn't the Weinberger Doctrine. It is really the Clinton and GHW Bush Administration's approaches to terrorism and state sponsors of terrorism as compared with the Reagan and GW Bush approaches to terrorism and state sponsors of terrorism.

Reagan and GW Bush have both treated terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism as acts of war requiring military responses. The real model for GW Bush is Reagan's response to Libyan state sponsorship of terrorism, when the US bombed Libya. That's the work of Cap Weinberger and George Schulz.

In contrast, when Pan Am 103 was bombed, GHW Bush turned to the courts to provide relief. Clinton's policy was also based on treating terrorism as international crime. That's why the FBI was designated as the lead agency after the embassy bombings. When Clinton did use military force, it was pinpricks using cruise missiles. That is completely contrary to the Weinberger Doctrine of not using military force unless you use it in an overwhelming manner. So the break from the Weinberger Doctrine took place around the early 1990s in the response to terrorism. GW Bush is really returning the US to the Weinberger Doctrine. When he uses military force it is the military as sledgehammer. He doesn't do little incremental steps, and he doesn't do symbolic missile attacks. So I'm afraid you really are making the wrong comparison here.

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
So why use the term "chickenhawk"? Sorry, I don't believe you.

What I said:
As an interesting side-note, quite a few of the neocons are the people that are often called "chickenhawks" by their critics. Behind the vitriol is the basic observation that very few, if any, of them have a background of military service or have children in military service.

Not only did I say "by their critics", but I identified it as "vitriol" and offered a view on why the insult is used and what its supposed to indicate.

Why does talking about neoconservatives suddenly make people so pedantic around here?

BOT:

I certainly understand their ideological objections to realpolitik. At one time or another, I think everyone who analyzes that period finds themselves questioning it. Some eventually find a rationalization, others don't.

Personally, its always been hard for me to find a context for the Nixon-Kissinger period. Then again, I tend to drift from Idealism to Pragmatism in general, not just in politics. No easy answers and all that.

But I can't help but get goosebumps at how easily ideas like "benevolent hegemony" and "exporting security" get tossed around here. It seems to me that they are so blinded by their notions of American exceptionalism that the patterns of history (particularly of empire) are entirely dismissed.

Not to mention the fact that I see considerable disconnect between the Idealism of such "neo-Reaganite" musings on using American power for good and the cold, hard economic policies steeped in realpolitik that seem to emerge from the same minds.

In fact, I think it is the actual or percieved conflicts of interest of many of the strong personalities called "neocons" that has largely contributed to the creeping suspicion many feel towards the movement in general. Richard Perle in particular is indicative of that. Its very hard for me to jive his passionate talk of the power of America's Principles at the same time he sees no problem in profiteering.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
Why does talking about neoconservatives suddenly make people so pedantic around here?

Because the way they are discussed makes them sound like some kind of virus who have injected themselves into the body politic. The way some people use the term neocon is not dissimilar to the way the right used to use the word communist.

There also seems to be an unstated assumption that they have somehow wormed their way into power and are subverting things. There is no acknowledgement that perhaps they have the influence they have because a lot of people agree with their analysis -- starting, of course, with the president who has every right to pick his advisors. That's why I said that people are concentrating on the evil people and not engaging the ideas represented.

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
I disagree with a couple of pretty major points here. I think you are making completely the wrong comparisn.

First, Weinberger was hardly dovish. The Reagan Administration was not afraid to use military force. Weinberger's concern was mainly that military force should be used as a part of a national strategy. His doctrine was a reaction mainly to the surruptitious use of force associated with Robert MacNamara in Vietnam. As well as some political criteria, the Weinberger Doctrine is most noted for its insistance that force when used should be overwhelming. In Vietnam, the use of force was slowly ramped up in what was dubbed incrementalism. The US really never brought its full weight to bear, and people like Weinberger saw the eventual defeat as being a result of this.

If you want to make some more recent comparisons, you could compare desert Storm with Kosovo. Kosovo was incrementalist. Desert Storm was a sledgehammer. Desert Storm was Colin Powell's implementation of the Weinberger Doctrine.

That illustrates my second objection. Powell is not nearly as dovish as some like to think he is. His current perceived dovishness is mainly a function of his office. He's the Secretary of State. Dovishness comes with the institutional territory.

If you want to compare the Bush Doctrine with anything, the proper comparison really isn't the Weinberger Doctrine. It is really the Clinton and GHW Bush Administration's approaches to terrorism and state sponsors of terrorism as compared with the Reagan and GW Bush approaches to terrorism and state sponsors of terrorism.

Reagan and GW Bush have both treated terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism as acts of war requiring military responses. The real model for GW Bush is Reagan's response to Libyan state sponsorship of terrorism, when the US bombed Libya. That's the work of Cap Weinberger and George Schulz.

In contrast, when Pan Am 103 was bombed, GHW Bush turned to the courts to provide relief. Clinton's policy was also based on treating terrorism as international crime. That's why the FBI was designated as the lead agency after the embassy bombings. When Clinton did use military force, it was pinpricks using cruise missiles. That is completely contrary to the Weinberger Doctrine of not using military force unless you use it in an overwhelming manner. So the break from the Weinberger Doctrine took place around the early 1990s in the response to terrorism. GW Bush is really returning the US to the Weinberger Doctrine. When he uses military force it is the military as sledgehammer. He doesn't do little incremental steps, and he doesn't do symbolic missile attacks. So I'm afraid you really are making the wrong comparison here.

I never called Weinberger Dovish. In fact, I can't say I have much impression of him at all.

My comments on Powell's "dovish"-ness was meant as a comparison to the feeling I get from people like Kagan and Kristol. That feeling is not because Powell hates force, but because Powell is so vocally reluctant to use it. He clearly advocates a "not until we have to" approach. The neocons/neoreaganites seem to be telling us that a weapon unused is a useless weapon. I see a fundamental difference there.

I agree wholeheartedly of their criticism of "incrementalism". But I do think there is a very big difference between Powell's repeated position of force as the very last measure (and then sledgehammer) and the "neo-Reaganite" idea of a sole-superpower not only eager to use military supremacy to get its way, but to extend military force into areas of economic policy. Not to mention the subtle aversion to multilateralism.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
I never called Weinberger Dovish. In fact, I can't say I have much impression of him at all.

The point is that what you are calling the Powell doctrine isn't Powell's at all. It's Weinberger's. Powell was Weinberger's assistant.

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
Because the way they are discussed makes them sound like some kind of virus who have injected themselves into the body politic. The way some people use the term neocon is not dissimilar to the way the right used to use the word communist.

There also seems to be an unstated assumption that they have somehow wormed their way into power and are subverting things. There is no acknowledgement that perhaps they have the influence they have because a lot of people agree with their analysis -- starting, of course, with the president who has every right to pick his advisors. That's why I said that people are concentrating on the evil people and not engaging the ideas represented.

And I don't find general use of "neocon" any more pejorative than general use of liberal, conservative, etc..

I have never argued that they have influence by way of subterfuge. On the contrary, I agree with Irving Kristol when he says he believes they saved Republicans from irrelevancy because their ideas resonnate very strongly with broad sections of the population.

If some people have suggested that there is some neocon "wormtongue" poisoning the mind of the King, it certainly wasn't me. I don't think they tricked or drugged Dubya, I think they simply persuaded him. Or maybe he wasn't really that far from their position during the election but he didn't really show it.

In fact, I remember distinctly that when I first started posting about PNAC leading up to the Iraq war, I argued vehemently that the smartest thing that the policy wonks in the administration could possibly do is argue their case for "regime change" on it's merits instead of taking the long way around in the hopes it would be the path of least resistance. I argued that relying on a shaky case for easy PR might actualy bite them in the ass if it turned out WMD or Al'Queda wasn't really in Iraq. Why take the chance of being wrong when you could argue for regime change on its merit?

I argued that if they honestly believe that Pax Americana was a great idea, they should take it directly to the American people and argue it on its merits. I'm confident that an awful lot of Americans would agree with them and find their ideas very persuasive.

As much as I don't agree with them, I have to admit that I honestly think lots and lots of Americans--perhaps even a majority--would support them wholeheartedly.

Now some people think that while the administration has whole-heartedly bought into the idea of Pax Americana, it doesn't come out and say so. They consider the War on Terror a hollow cover for the "real" policy of becoming the benevolent hegemon.

I don't know. Sometimes I think that might be the case and other times I don't.

One way to answer the question once and for all would be to begin openly talking about it. It seems to me that when anyone mentions PNAC or "neocon" or such that everyone goes into hyper-defensive mode, even going so far as to suggest they don't exist or that even if they did they never met one. That just fuels people's worst fears about it.

I trust that these men honestly and sincerely believe they have the right ideas. Their vision is a matter of public record. What isn't, is the degree to which their ideas have influenced Bush or perhaps the degree to which Bush has always agreed with them.

Why can't this be talked about openly? Make the case to the public. Get it out in the open. What do we have to fear from that?

[thunderous_funker]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
The point is that what you are calling the Powell doctrine isn't Powell's at all. It's Weinberger's. Powell was Weinberger's assistant.

Type "the powell doctrine" in google and see what you get. I appreciate your attention to historical detail, but suggesting that I'm somehow mistaken in calling it such ignores the fact that this name is common usage.

Hell, its even a term in some encyclopedias.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:


Type "the powell doctrine" in google and see what you get. I appreciate your attention to historical detail, but suggesting that I'm somehow mistaken in calling it such ignores the fact that this name is common usage.

Hell, its even a term in some encyclopedias.

You are right about that. It is the name that stuck because of Powell's role in the Gulf War. But the problem is that it has been associated wrongly with his personality, and with the wrong decade. It's very much a 1980s thing, very much more Reagan than Bush 1 and Clinton.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
One way to answer the question once and for all would be to begin openly talking about it. It seems to me that when anyone mentions PNAC or "neocon" or such that everyone goes into hyper-defensive mode, even going so far as to suggest they don't exist or that even if they did they never met one. That just fuels people's worst fears about it.

I believe you in what you say and your willingness to debate the issues openly. But it isn't because of people like you that people on the other side get defensive. I think perhaps you need to look around at the state of the debate. It is mostly not intellectual and all about the ideas. An awful lot of it verges on the ranting.

Neocon gets thown around here and in the media much the same way as some American conservatives throw around the word communist or liberal. Think of how you guys react when some people here call all Europeans socialists and talk about how the EU is sinking in a mire. The response is indignant because you can tell right off that you are dealing with a closed mind. This is no different.

[vmarks]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:


Type "the powell doctrine" in google and see what you get. I appreciate your attention to historical detail, but suggesting that I'm somehow mistaken in calling it such ignores the fact that this name is common usage.

Hell, its even a term in some encyclopedias.

What reputable encyclopedia takes so short a view of history?

[Lerkfish]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
I believe you in what you say and your willingness to debate the issues openly. But it isn't because of people like you that people on the other side get defensive. I think perhaps you need to look around at the state of the debate. It is mostly not intellectual and all about the ideas. An awful lot of it verges on the ranting.

Neocon gets thown around here and in the media much the same way as some American conservatives throw around the word communist or liberal. Think of how you guys react when some people here call all Europeans socialists and talk about how the EU is sinking in a mire. The response is indignant because you can tell right off that you are dealing with a closed mind. This is no different.

Simey, please trash me in the thread you've already derailed and leave t_f's pristine, if you would. Character assassination for the sake of your pettiness is distracting. At least keep your personal attacks to one thread only. I've been good and stayed out of this one for now, out of respect for t_F, BUT this is the third time in this thread you've tried me in absentia.
Get over it, get over me, and move on with your life.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by Lerkfish:
Simey, please trash me in the thread you've already derailed and leave t_f's pristine, if you would. Character assassination for the sake of your pettiness is distracting. At least keep your personal attacks to one thread only. I've been good and stayed out of this one for now, out of respect for t_F, BUT this is the third time in this thread you've tried me in absentia.
Get over it, get over me, and move on with your life.

I wasn't talking about you. Notice I said "here and in the media." You are not in the media, and you are not the only person who uses the term on these boards.

You are being spooked by your own shadow. Calm down.

[petehammer]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
I wasn't talking about you. Notice I said "here and in the media." You are not in the media...

Really? What is Lurk's job again?

[roger_ramjet]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
Why does talking about neoconservatives suddenly make people so pedantic around here?

It has nothing to do with being pedantic. It's about being precise. Again I ask, how and when did Cheney and Rumsfeld become neoconservative? Hint: they aren't. And it's not just about precision: why the obsession with neoconservatives while glossing over Reagan's influence? As I already noted, the term neo-Reaganism is a better one.

I've long read Commentary. I know the influence neoconservatism has had but as Irving Kristol has noted, "the distinction between conservative and neoconservative has been blurred almost beyond recognition." If you want to understand the intellectual cross-currents shaping the Bush admin's foreign policy, narrowly focusing on neoconservatism doesn't really get you very far.

[Face Ache]

Originally posted by thunderous_funker:
Why does talking about neoconservatives suddenly make people so pedantic around here?

Because the achilles tendon is a sensitive area.

[SimeyTheLimey]

Thunderous: I saw this and thought you might be interested in it.

Analysis
The 'Bush Doctrine' Experiences Shining Moments

By Dana Milbank
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, December 21, 2003; Page A26

It has been a week of sweet vindication for those who promulgated what they call the Bush Doctrine.

Beginning with the capture of Saddam Hussein a week ago and ending Friday with an agreement by Libya's Moammar Gaddafi to surrender his unconventional weapons, one after another international problem has eased.

On Tuesday, the leaders of France and Germany set aside their long-standing opposition to the war in Iraq and agreed to forgive an unspecified amount of that country's debt. On Thursday, Iran signed an agreement allowing surprise inspections of its nuclear facilities after European governments applied intense pressure on the U.S. foe. On Friday, Libya agreed to disarm under the watch of international inspectors, just as administration officials were learning that Syria had seized $23.5 million believed to be for al Qaeda.

To foreign policy hard-liners inside and outside the administration, the gestures by Libya, Iran and Syria, and the softening by France and Germany, all have the same cause: a show of American might.

Those who developed the Bush Doctrine -- a policy of taking preemptive, unprovoked action against emerging threats -- predicted that an impressive U.S. victory in Iraq would intimidate allies and foes alike, making them yield to U.S. interests in other areas. Though that notion floundered with the occupation in Iraq, the capture of Hussein may have served as the decisive blow needed to make others respect U.S. wishes, they say.

"It's always been at the heart of the Bush Doctrine that a more robust policy would permit us to elicit greater cooperation from adversaries than we'd had in the past when we acquiesced," said Richard Perle, an influential adviser to the administration. "With the capture of Saddam, the sense that momentum may be with us is very important." Perle had provoked much criticism for saying a successful U.S. invasion of Iraq would signal to other foes that "you're next." But he said the actions by Libya and Iran prove that the threat alone was sufficient to produce action. "Gaddafi surely had to take more seriously that we would not allow him to get away with the programs he was embarked," he said.

Perle and the other "neo-conservative" hawks whose views dominate the Bush administration know better than to claim victory. Gaddafi or the Iranians may still cheat despite admitting inspectors. And other potential foes, notably North Korea and China, have shown little susceptibility to the threat implicit in the Bush Doctrine. Still, Perle allowed, "it's nice to have a good week every once in a while." [more follows]

[BlackGriffen]

Originally posted by SimeyTheLimey:
Thunderous: I saw this and thought you might be interested in it.

The opinion is far from unanimous. In fact, this article seems to look at things more closely.

Libyan deal shows need for shift in U.S. diplomatic tactics, analysts say
WASHINGTON (AP) � The White House portrayed Libya's promise to abandon weapons of mass destruction programs as affirmation of President Bush's hard-line strategy on arms proliferation and suggested the U.S.-led war in Iraq helped convince Moammar Gadhafi that he should act.

Some arms control experts, however, point to what is known about how and when the agreement came about and say that Libya's turnaround offers proof the United States should shift tactics in dealing with North Korea, Syria and other nations. A greater commitment is needed, they say, to the kind of patient but firm diplomacy that worked with Libya.

"The president is trying hard to portray this as a victory for his strategy," said Joseph Cirincione, director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's nonproliferation project. "But when you look at this, it's almost the opposite of the Bush doctrine."

Announcing the Libya deal, Bush invoked the Iraq war that brought down Saddam Hussein as he issued a flat warning of "unwelcome consequences" for countries that do not follow Libya's lead.

White House officials promoted Friday's Libya announcement as vindication of Bush's decision to make war on Saddam, even though banned weapons, Bush's prime public reason for waging it, have not been found.

British officials say that perhaps just as important was the long diplomatic process of getting Libyan leader Gadhafi to take responsibility for the 1988 downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.

Gadhafi initiated the weapons talks in March, amid the buildup in the Persian Gulf area to the U.S.-led war in Iraq. The overtures came just after Libya agreed to a $2.7 billion settlement for the Pan Am bombing.

As a result, Britain pushed successfully for the lifting of U.N. penalties against on Libya, a sprawling desert country in northwest Africa.

Libya first contacted the British, not the Americans, noted Daryl Kimball of the private Arms Control Association. Also, Libya had worked for several years to shed its pariah status before Iraq became an issue.

Many analysts say the war's aftermath has proved so difficult for the United States that other countries probably view U.S. military force as an unlikely option elsewhere right now.

"The plan was that Iraq was to be a message for everyone to either fall in line, or else," Cirincione said. "The problem is this threat is not very realistic."

In justifying war against Iraq but not other countries, the Bush administration has argued that combating the development of banned weapons requires different strategies in different situations.

Still, the administration's nonmilitary alternatives typically involve tough talk, a hard line against negotiating and the offer of few incentives to comply.

Critics contend the approach has produced little success.

North Korea, for instance, is well aware of the Iraq situation and, if anything, has "stiffened its spine" over the past three years of Bush's presidency, Kimball said.

Six-party negotiations aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear ambitions are suspended into at least early next year, with the United States accusing the communist country of demanding unacceptable conditions.

Syria, despite recent positive moves, still hosts Palestinian militant groups and is suspected of seeking biological and chemical weapons and helping insurgents in Iraq.

Iran, however, signed an important accord last week to open its nuclear facilities to international inspections.

That breakthrough was the result of months of European-led negotiations that took a pro-engagement position toward Tehran. The United States had supported threatening Iran with U.N. sanctions.

A combination of firm but respectful engagement with the clear promise of a reward is also what appeared to work with Libya, with Britain and the United States acting quietly behind the scenes.

"The administration is changing the policy, in fact, without changing the words," Cirincione said.

A White House official said the administration had indicated to the Libyans that 17 years of U.S. penalties against Tripoli were on the table.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, even raised the possibility that Libya's quick fulfillment of its promises could result in the lifting of the sanctions within months.

After Libya's announcement, Bush praised Gadhafi personally, offering respectability to a once-reviled ruler, and made no mention of the Lockerbie crash even though Sunday was the 15th anniversary of the plane's downing.

"They relied more on carrots than sticks," Cirincione said. "And it worked."

Although I doubt that the Bush doctrine had no effect whatsoever, I'm certain that it alone would have failed. Cornered animals can be extremely deadly, especially humans.

At best, the US is playing "Bad cop" in an apparently unintentional tag team.

Even granting that, though, playing bad cop is expensive to the point of being unsustainable in the long run, and will leave us as a pariah if the administration doesn't play the cards right.

BlackGriffen

[SimeyTheLimey]

Originally posted by BlackGriffen:
The opinion is far from unanimous.

Well that's a shock.

The truth is probably somewhere in the middle. I don't think it can be claimed as the fruit entirely of the Bush Doctrine. US policy toward Libya has been rather consistent since the 1980s and therefore has much deeper roots than the Bush Doctrine. However, it is not inconceivable as the New York Times says that Bush's policy gave Libya the last push. Certainly, the timing is interesting and Libya was the target of one of the antecedents of the Bush Doctrine under Reagan. So Libya is no doubt acutely aware of at least the potential stick, as well as the carrot we are waving in front of them. So I think you basically have a combination of incentives.

The odd thing is that the people at Carnegie are calling for a multilateral approach to North Korea. What do they think is happening?

[roger_ramjet]

from BG's article: "Gadhafi initiated the weapons talks in March..."

What was it that happened in March? This announcement was made exactly nine months after that initial bombing that attempted to decapitate Saddam's regime before the war even started. Draw your own conclusions.

[Lerkfish]

Originally posted by roger_ramjet:
from BG's article: "Gadhafi initiated the weapons talks in March..."

What was it that happened in March? This announcement was made exactly nine months after that initial bombing that attempted to decapitate Saddam's regime before the war even started. Draw your own conclusions.

someone got pregnant?